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NOTE
A Test By Any Other Name: The Influence of
Justice Breyer’s Concurrence in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
Alex S. Moe*
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Supreme Court applied
the presumption against extraterritorial application to the Alien Tort
Statute (“ATS”). In doing so, the Court undermined the generally
accepted view of the ATS: that it could apply to actions abroad.
Applying this presumption severely limited the factual circumstances
that could produce a viable ATS claim. The majority opinion carved an
exception, permitting extraterritorial ATS claims that “touch and
concern” the United States, but declined to set more specific guidelines.
In the absence of such guidelines, lower courts have applied the
presumption in an overbroad fashion, barring claims that the Court
might have intended to fall within its exception.
However, concurring in Kiobel, Justice Breyer offered an
alternative three-pronged test to determine jurisdiction. Though Justice
Breyer reached the same conclusion as the Court—that jurisdiction did
not lie—his test is more specific than the majority’s and also provides
lower courts with a proper means of assessing ATS extraterritoriality.
This Note first extensively discusses the rich and colorful history of
the ATS, tracking its outgrowth from the Articles of Confederation to its
use in the eighteenth century to bring pirates to justice. It then
discusses the modern line of ATS cases, including the various
procedural elements that courts have read into the Statute. Turning to
Kiobel, it examines the impact of the Court’s reversal of precedent by
applying a presumption against extraterritorial application to the ATS,
specifically focusing on the majority standard’s lack of clarity. This
* B.A., Northwestern University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, 2015.
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Note concludes by proposing that the best way to reasonably limit the
ATS’ scope while still allowing meritorious claims to proceed is to use
Justice Breyer’s test.
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INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute “is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has
been with us since the first Judiciary Act . . . no one seems to know
whence it came.” – Judge Henry Friendly1
The Alien Tort Statute2 (“ATS”) is 124 years old, but has a body of
case law only a tenth its age. Passed by the first session of the First
Congress, it was applied a handful of times in the eighteenth century
before disappearing almost entirely from American jurisprudence,
spending 185 years as little more than a footnote.3 In 1980, the Second
Circuit breathed new life into the statute by applying it in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, extending and updating it to provide jurisdiction over acts
of torture.4
Aggrieved aliens were quick to capitalize on the new grant of
jurisdiction, and in the years after Filartiga the ATS saw regular use in

1. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (rejecting ATS claim for failure to
allege a treaty violation). The substantive holding of Vencap was later abrogated, but Judge
Friendly’s characterization of the ATS is timeless.
2. Unlike most contemporary legislation, the ATS was not appended a short name; references
to it in early cases are always to the language of the statute itself. See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny,
17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895) (referring to “the words of the judiciary act of the United
States”). The term “Alien Tort Statute” first appeared in 1980, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). It is also known both as the Alien Tort Claims Act, e.g. Benjamins v.
British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), and the Alien Tort(s) Act, e.g. Huyn Thi
Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978). All three terms are synonymous. This Note follows
contemporary practice and refers to the statute as the Alien Tort Statute, or ATS.
3. See infra Part I.B (discussing applications of the ATS between 1795 and 1980).
4. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 (holding that ATS provides jurisdiction over violations of the law
of nations, which includes torture); see also infra Part I.C.1 (discussing Filartiga).
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courts.5 Without much legislative or jurisprudential precedent to draw
upon, courts developed procedural and substantive standards to set
boundaries on ATS jurisdiction.6 The Supreme Court first entered the
fray in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004, outlining a test with which to
evaluate the merits of ATS claims.7 The Sosa test did much to establish
common boundaries, but many significant issues remained unanswered.
The Court granted certiorari in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
to consider one such issue: whether corporations could be held liable for
torts committed abroad.8
Oral arguments uncovered a further
foundational question: whether the ATS could have any extraterritorial
application at all.9 The Court ultimately held the ATS subject to a
presumption against extraterritorial application, a presumption that
could be overcome only by claims that touched and concerned the
United States’ territory.10 The Court’s ruling was unanimous, but four
Justices, led by Justice Breyer, concurred only in the judgment and used
an entirely different approach. They argued that the presumption
against extraterritoriality did not apply to the ATS and offered an
alternate test to determine whether jurisdiction would be proper.11
This Note starts by discussing the relatively sparse background of the
ATS, including events in the eighteenth century that likely sparked its
drafting.12 It reviews the few cases that occurred in the eighteenth
century, the ATS’ absence in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth
centuries, and the Second Circuit’s landmark ruling in Filartiga.13 It
5. The total number of cases brought under the ATS is not objectively large, but even a few
cases can be highly significant, given the 185-year drought.
6. See infra Part I.D (discussing procedural limitations on the ATS that courts have developed
since Filartiga).
7. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also infra Part I.C.2 (discussing Sosa).
See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671–72
(2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing the mechanism by which Sosa limited ATS
jurisprudence).
8. 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (granting certiorari to consider question of corporate liability); see also
infra Part II.A.2; infra notes 244–248 and accompanying text (discussing procedural history of
Kiobel).
9. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (granting rehearing to consider extraterritorial application of
ATS); see infra Part II.A.2; infra notes 244–248 and accompanying text (discussing procedural
history of Kiobel).
10. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. See generally infra Part II.B (discussing the majority opinion).
11. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670–71 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally infra Part II.E
(discussing concurring opinion of Justice Breyer).
12. See infra Part I.A (providing an overview of the historical and legislative background of
the ATS between 1781 and 1789).
13. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing applications of the ATS between its enactment in 1798
and Filartiga in 1980).
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discusses the Supreme Court’s guidance in Sosa,14 the various
procedural requirements that lower courts have held applicable, and
extraterritoriality, the issue at the heart of Kiobel.15
Part II lays out Kiobel, presenting the opinion of the Court, the
concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and Alito, and the concurring
opinion of Justice Breyer.16 Part III reviews and analyzes the two
primary lines of legal reasoning presented within the opinions: first, the
“touch and concern” standard of the majority; and second, the threepoint test articulated by Justice Breyer.17
The Note then examines the current state of ATS jurisprudence and
the effects that the majority holding of Kiobel has already had. It
suggests a way in which Kiobel could be applied to reduce confusion
and improper application in a manner consistent with legislative and
judicial precedent.18 It first describes the increasing importance of ATS
litigation,19 and then discusses the need for a clear standard by
examining the current and conflicting ways in which lower courts have
applied the majority holding of Kiobel.20 It proposes that the alternative
test offered by Justice Breyer can be reconciled into the majority’s
standard as a test reaching the same conclusion, with potential
discrepancies remaining acceptable in light of legal precedent.21 This
Note closes by examining cases that suggest such an approach, and
concludes that a reconciled standard would be both possible and
preferable to the current confusion that has arisen when courts have
attempted to apply the Kiobel holding.22
I. BACKGROUND
The Alien Tort Statute provides, in full, that “[t]he district courts

14. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing Sosa).
15. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. See infra Parts I.D–E (summarizing procedural requirements
of the ATS, including prior holdings on extraterritorial application of the ATS).
16. See infra Parts II.B–E (discussing the four opinions of Kiobel: one majority and three
concurring).
17. See infra Part III (discussing elements of and potential issues with the standard of the
majority and the test proposed by Justice Breyer’s concurrence).
18. See infra Part IV (presenting present and potential future impacts of Kiobel).
19. See infra Part IV.A (discussing increasing importance and relevance of ATS legislation).
20. See infra Part IV.B (concluding that Kiobel is currently being applied unevenly, and in
some cases, in a manner that suggests that courts are committing errors of law).
21. See infra Part IV.C (reconciling Justice Breyer’s test as a method of approaching the
majority’s standard).
22. See infra Part IV.D (discussing several subsequent cases that apply Kiobel, with a focus on
interpretation of the majority’s standard in light of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion).
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shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”23 It was passed by the first session of the First Congress
as a direct implementation of the Constitution’s Offenses Clause,24
explicitly giving federal courts jurisdiction over potentially sensitive
diplomatic issues.25 Used sporadically in the eighteenth century, it lay
fallow for nearly two hundred years before being revived in 1980.26
Since then, modern ATS developments have addressed and resolved
several difficulties,27 only once receiving guidance from the Supreme
Court.28 Because of the relative absence of appellate jurisprudence and
the youth of the modern line of cases, a number of important issues
remain unaddressed. This lack of guidance results in divergent
interpretations of relatively basic elements, such as whether a statute of
limitations applies and the nature of permissible parties to an ATS

23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The cited language is from the current statute, which is
substantively the same as the original 1789 text:
That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States,
cognizance . . . concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 9; see infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (discussing
passage of Judiciary Act). The ATS formed part of the first codification of United States law as
part of the Revised Statutes of the United States in 1873: “The district courts shall have
jurisdiction . . . . Of all suits brought by any alien for a tort only in violation of the law of nations,
or of a treaty of the United States.” 1 Rev. Stat. § 563, cl. 16 (1875). Its codification into U.S.C.
broke the clauses from the Revised Statutes into freestanding statutes, used the term of art
“original jurisdiction,” and added the verb “committed.” Judicial Code of 1911, § 24, cl. 17, 36
Stat. 1087, 1093 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41, cl. 17 (1911)). The current text dates to 1948, the
only change in that codification being a substitution of the term “civil action” for the term “suits.”
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1350, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948)).
This modification was made pursuant to the then-recently adopted Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which then as now provide that there is one form of action: the civil action. FED. R.
CIV. P. 2.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see infra text accompanying note 43 (discussing the
Offenses Clause).
25. Roughly speaking, the exact purpose of the ATS remains unclear; during the eighteenth
century it was used primarily to provide jurisdiction over cases of seizure and piracy. See infra
Part I.B.1 (discussing the uses of the ATS in the eighteenth century). The specific intentions of
the ATS’ drafters have consistently been at issue in modern jurisprudence.
26. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see infra Part I.C.1 (discussing
Filartiga).
27. See infra Parts I.D–E (discussing a variety of procedural elements to application of the
ATS, including extraterritoriality, which was at issue in Kiobel).
28. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (providing guidelines on what underlying
factual allegations constitute a violation of the law of nations sufficient to permit ATS
jurisdiction); see infra Part I.C.2 (analyzing Sosa in detail).
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A. Historical Context of the Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute’s history may be sparse,30 but its origins
extend to before the Constitution. The Articles of Confederation
recognized the existence of State courts, but by themselves did not
directly establish any courts under the central government of the
Confederacy.31 The Articles authorized Congress to create only two
permanent types of courts: (1) trial courts for piracy and felonies on the
high seas; and (2) an appellate court for the same.32
While the Articles of Confederation were in force, criminal matters
were tried in State courts.33 When the later drafters of the Constitution
were framing Congress’ jurisdiction, they were influenced by two highprofile offenses against foreign ambassadors that occurred around this

29. See infra Parts I.D–E (discussing procedural factors that may play into application of the
ATS).
30. The ATS was successfully invoked only four times between its enactment and the Second
Circuit’s landmark decision in Filartiga—a period of 191 years. O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke,
209 U.S. 45 (1908); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); M’Grath v. The
Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 127 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8809); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa.
1793) (No. 9895); see also infra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s erroneous
assertion in Kiobel that the ATS was only invoked twice in the eighteenth century).
31. E.g. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 2 (requiring Congressionallyappointed commissioners to take an oath administered by a judge of a state’s superior court). The
Articles themselves established only one central body: Congress. Id. art. IX (granting powers of
the United States solely to Congress, and establishing no other political organs). Whereas Article
III of the Constitution establishes only one Court, but grants to Congress the power to establish
inferior federal courts, the Articles of Confederation themselves established neither permanent
courts nor any mechanism for determining judicial primacy. See infra note 32 and accompanying
text (discussing the judicial mechanisms provided for under the Articles of Confederation).
32. Congress “shall have the sole and exclusive right and power . . . [to] appoint[] courts for
the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas . . . .”
ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1. Notably, this power was exclusive with the states.
Congress was also established as the ultimate determiner of conflicts of “boundary, jurisdiction or
any other cause whatever” between multiple States, but these conflicts were not to be resolved in
a court. The conflict resolution procedure involved selecting three candidates from each State,
then having the aggrieved States alternately strike candidates until seven to nine were left, and
then having the remaining candidates form an adjudicative panel to hear the case. While sensible
enough, this procedure would create different panels for every issue, resulting in ad hoc
adjudication rather than a permanent judicial body, establishing a system not unlike that of
modern arbitration proceedings.
33. Without a permanent Confederate judicial body of any sort, only state courts would have
existed for criminal matters, the only exception being limited but exclusive jurisdiction for
confederate trials and appeals in cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas. See supra note
32 and accompanying text (discussing judicial principles under the Articles of Confederation).
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time: an assault in 1784, and a violation of territorial integrity in 1787.34
In 1784, a French army veteran threatened and subsequently assaulted
the Consul General of France to the United States.35 The defendant was
tried, convicted, and ultimately fined and jailed for two years,36 with no
apparent indication of any irregularities in the judicial process.37
Regular or not, however, French officials were concerned that the
process was governed entirely by State law and that the Confederate
central government was powerless to intervene; the French ambassador
lodged a formal complaint to that end with the Continental Congress.38
Three years later, during the Constitutional Convention, a New York
constable entered the house of a Dutch ambassador to arrest one of the
ambassador’s servants.39 Then-Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay
directed the Mayor of New York to arrest the constable in turn.40
Reporting to Congress on the Dutch ambassador’s subsequent
complaint, he explained that the Confederate government was not
vested with powers to hear such cases.41
In response to these incidents, the United States Constitution was
drafted to grant Congress the power “[t]o define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations.”42 The Offenses Clause43 adopted the “piracies and felonies
34. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1666 (2013)
(providing a brief synopsis of the eighteenth-century assaults in question).
35. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111–12 (Pa. 1784); see also Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. at 1666 (discussing the underlying facts of Respublica).
36. Respublica, 1 U.S. at 118.
37. Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of
Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1692–93 (2012) (finding no evidence of irregularity or
other untoward procedure in the subsequent state criminal proceedings); see also Alfred
Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps Affair, 63 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 294, 298 (1939)
(noting that, because of the ambassador’s personal popularity, “There was never any question of
negligence on the part of Pennsylvania.”).
38. Respublica, 1 U.S. at 112; see also Rosenthal, supra note 37, at 298–300 (discussing
debate, resolutions, and U.S.–France negotiations in the wake of the incident).
39. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (discussing the facts of the incident); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 717 (2004) (discussing the factual background).
40. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct at 1666.
41. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 (discussing Secretary Jay’s explanations to Congress after speaking
with the Dutch ambassador); see also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective
Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of The Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467,
494 n.152 (1986) (providing a more complete background of the event in question).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The exact definition of what offenses against the law of
nations consist in is unclear. The Filartiga court included torture in this list. Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court established a test to define the term
in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737.
43. For more on the other effect of this clause, see generally Kontorovich, supra note 37.
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committed on the high seas” language from the Articles of
Confederation,44 but it expanded the crimes covered to include offenses
against the law of nations.45 Under this formulation, Congress could
have regulated the two incidents in 1784 and 1787, as assault against
ambassadors and violations of safe conduct were already a part of
British common law.46 The First Congress implemented this language
from the Offenses Clause in its first session47 in passing the Judiciary
Act of 1789.48 This Act, inter alia, both solved the ambassadorial
question by giving the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits
brought by diplomats49 and created the Alien Tort Statute.50
Few historical references to the ATS exist, but those few stand out.51
In 1794, several American citizens joined a French fleet in an attack
against the British colony in Sierra Leone.52 In response to a British
complaint, Attorney General William Bradford issued a formal opinion
stating that actions that took place in a foreign country were not
punishable within the United States, but those that took place on the
high seas were, and furthermore that those injured had access to a civil
remedy.53 This “civil remedy” is a clear reference to the ATS, both

44. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1, with U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10.
45. This further gave Congress the power to define all three types of crimes.
46. And would therefore be both incorporated into the fledgling American common law and
more generally considered as the law of nations. Kontorovich, supra note 37, at 1693–94, 1693
n.82.
47. The Judiciary Act was passed on September 24, 1789, Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
five days before the close of the First Congress’ first session on September 29, 1789. Dates of the
Sessions of Congress, present–1789, UNITED STATES SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/
Sessions/sessionDates.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).
48. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. Formally, the Judiciary Act was passed as “[a]n Act to
establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,” as Chapter XX of the Public Acts of the First
Congress. The term “Judiciary Act” stuck almost immediately, as at the time there was of course
only one of them. See, e.g., Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895)
(referring to “the words of the judiciary act of the United States”).
49. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716 (2004)
(noting the Judiciary Act’s purpose to ensure jurisdiction over diplomatic suits).
50. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9.
51. Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 509 (2012) (discussing the few contemporary references to the ATS).
52. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795) (document produced to explain the
United States’ actions as a result of the incident); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667–68 (2013) (discussing the opinion of Attorney General
Bradford); Bradley, supra note 51, at 518–20 (providing an overview of the incident).
53. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795).
So far . . . as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign
country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts, nor can the actors be legally
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describing it and echoing its language.54 While previously the ATS was
used to justify actions resulting from conduct on the high seas,55 the
ambiguity in his text implies that the ATS might justify a suit for
tortious conduct that occurred abroad—the major modern-day use of the
ATS.56
B. Historical Uses of the Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute was referred to three times in the eighteenth
century:57 once denying jurisdiction, once providing jurisdiction, and
once granting alternative jurisdiction.58 It did not appear at any point in
the nineteenth century. Between 1900 and 1980, it was only referred to
twice, both in passing.59 All references support interpreting the ATS as

prosecuted or punished for them by the United States . . . crimes committed on the high
seas are within the jurisdiction of the . . . courts of the United States . . . . But there can
be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts of
hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction
being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
54. Id. The language used by Attorney General Bradford is a clear reference to the ATS.
55. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing uses of the ATS in cases involving action on the high
seas).
56. This was, in fact, the argument of the plaintiffs in Kiobel. Attorney General Bradford
states that actions in a foreign country are not within the cognizance of American courts. He
continues, however, by saying that foreign actions cannot be criminally punished, and that ones
on the high seas can, but “there can be no doubt” that there exists a civil remedy for those
“injured by these acts of hostility.” See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795).
This phrasing introduces ambiguity as to whether the “acts of hostility” include only actions on
the high seas, or whether they encompass, as the Kiobel plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued, all
foreign actions. The Kiobel court ultimately sidestepped the issue, holding that Attorney General
Bradford’s opinion “hardly suffices to counter the weighty concerns underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
57. The Court in Kiobel asserts that the ATS was invoked only twice in the eighteenth
century. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (citing Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No.
1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895)). There exists a third case,
M’Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 127 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8809), which makes reference to the
ATS. M’Grath uses the ATS to provide jurisdiction for an enforcement action, rather than to
decide a case on merits, but the case is worth mentioning, given that references of any sort to the
ATS are few and far between.
The Court’s omission here is not unusual, given the general difficulty of conducting legal
research around the founding of the nation; only eight years prior, the Court in Sosa noted only
one pre-Filartiga case (Bolchos) where the ATS provided jurisdiction. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). Perhaps the Court’s next holding on the ATS will make mention of
M’Grath.
58. Respectively, these cases are Moxon, 17 F. Cas. 942; M’Grath, 16 F. Cas. 127; and
Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. 810.
59. In O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908), the ATS was cursorily dismissed;
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a purely jurisdictional vehicle, with causes of action supplied by
common law.60
1. First Applications in the Eighteenth Century
The first case to discuss the Alien Tort Statute was Moxon v. The
Fanny, which was decided four years after the enactment of the ATS.61
In Moxon, the owners of a British ship sued in the District Court of
Pennsylvania for damages after a French privateer seized it in United
States territorial waters.62 As neither party was American, jurisdiction
flowed solely from the ATS.63 The plaintiff sued, requesting both
return of the seized goods and damages arising from the seizure.64 The
court dismissed, holding that, when both property and damages were
sought, the suit could not be properly called one for “tort only,” as the
ATS requires.65 This restrictive holding is sensible in the light of the
ATS’ explicit limitation and implies that, without further legislation, a
plaintiff bringing an ATS claim could only recover damages.66
The second and third cases provide a less restrictive interpretation of
the ATS.67 One case used it as basis to uphold a claim; the other refers
in Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ International Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960), the
parties do not appear to have argued the ATS, and it was discussed only briefly.
60. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s finding in Sosa that
the ATS is purely jurisdictional).
61. Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 942 (disallowing recovery for seizure at sea based on ATS).
62. Id. at 942–43; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1667 (2013) (discussing Moxon); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (discussing Moxon).
63. “[T]his court is particularly by law vested with authority where an alien sues for a tort
only in violation of the laws of nations . . . and this is a case falling under that description.”
Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 943.
64. Id. Personal jurisdiction was satisfied by personal presence: “[b]y bringing property into
our ports captors submit to our jurisdiction.” Id. at 944. A relevant Treaty of Alliance with
France satisfied the ATS’ treaty requirement. Id. at 947.
65. “It cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when the property, as well as damages for the
supposed trespass, are sought for.” Id. at 947–48 (dismissing case for failure to satisfy ATS).
66. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (“[T]he judge [in Moxon] gave no intimation that further
legislation would have been needed to give the District Court jurisdiction over a suit limited to
damages.”).
67. The same judge sitting in the same court heard both cases: Judge Thomas Bee (1739–
1812). Judge Bee served, inter alia, as South Carolina’s Lieutenant Governor (1780), one of its
delegates to the Second Continental Congress (1780–81), and a state Senator (1788–90). George
Washington appointed him to the federal bench in 1790, where he served until his death in 1812.
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Bee, Thomas, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=140. Judge Bee was also one of President Adams’
(in)famous midnight judges: he was nominated and confirmed as Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit,
but declined the office. List of John Adams’s Appointments, 23 February 1801, in 33 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 17 FEBRUARY TO 30 APRIL 1801, at 52, 558 (Barbara Olberg
ed., 2006) (appointing Judges Bee, Sitgreaves, and Clay to the Fifth Circuit, marking Thomas Bee
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to the ATS to buttress admiralty jurisdiction.68 In M’Grath v. The
Candalero,69 a privateer seized the titular Candalero; her owners sued,
citing to the ATS and a treaty with France as the basis for jurisdiction.70
An English court deemed the seizure illegal, while the American
proceedings in the District of South Carolina were for enforcement,
which was duly granted.71
One year later, in Bolchos v. Darrel,72 a French privateer captured a
British vessel and brought it to an American port.73 When in port, the
ship’s Spanish mortgagee seized its cargo of slaves.74 The French
privateer sued the Spanish mortgagee in South Carolina, arguing that
under the American treaty with France,75 he had rightfully seized the
slaves, which were therefore his property.76 The seizure took place in

as Chief).
68. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (using ATS to support
jurisdiction); M’Grath v. The Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 127 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8809) (using ATS to
buttress, and noting that Bee declined jurisdiction in an enforcement action).
69. 16 F. Cas. 127. The first party’s name is given in the original document as “M’Grath,” but
the case has been subsequently cited as “McGrath.” See, e.g., United States v. The Schooner
Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 540 (1841) (referring to “McGrath v. The Candelero”). This
Note uses the original spelling of “M’Grath,” as per the original form of publication in the
Federal Cases.
70. M’Grath, 16 F. Cas. at 127. Incidentally, this was the same treaty as in Moxon. See supra
note 64 and accompanying text (treaty in Moxon).
71. M’Grath, 16 F. Cas. at 127. The nature of the prior proceedings is unclear. The court said
only that, “as the illegality of th[e] seizure was pronounced [in England], as the action is
transitory, and the actor has chosen to seek for compensation in this court, I must say that his suit
is properly brought.” Id. at 128. Interestingly enough, though the parties jointly agreed to offer
money as security, they forgot to actually attach the vessel to its titular suit. After the adverse
judgment, the defendants sought to use the loophole and moved to review the proceedings, a
motion summarily denied. Id.
72. 3 F. Cas. 810.
73. Id. The facts of the case do not clarify for which war the privateer was commissioned.
Normally this would be self-evident, but in 1795 there were two ongoing wars between Britain
and France: the War of the First Coalition (1792–97), where Britain joined Austria, the
Hapsburgs, Prussia, and various Italian states in an attempt to contain Revolutionary France; and
the War in the Vendée (1793–96), a French counterrevolution in which British forces armed
French royalists in what was legally a separate conflict. In either case, both British and French
governments would have issued letters of marque, as the practice of commissioning private
agents to attack foreign vessels was a common one at the time. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11 (authorizing Congress to issue letters of marque). The practice has become rare; though its
power to do so remains intact, Congress has not issued a letter of marque since the War of 1812.
See generally William Young, Note, A Check on Faint-Hearted Presidents: Letters of Marque
and Reprisal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 895, 907 (2009) (overview of letters of marque).
74. Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810 (discussing facts of the case).
75. This was the same treaty as in Moxon and M’Grath. See supra text accompanying notes
64 and 70.
76. Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810. The question of whether a slave could be property did not, of
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port—and therefore on land—but the case was brought in admiralty, so
there was some question as to the appropriateness of the district court’s
jurisdiction.77 The court affirmed its jurisdiction on the grounds that the
action arose at sea, thus making the action eligible for an admiralty
ruling; furthermore, because state courts had already dismissed the case
believing federal admiralty jurisdiction proper, dismissing the federal
case at that point would have been a miscarriage of justice.78 Lastly, the
court mentioned that, because the ATS would provide concurrent
jurisdiction, any doubt on the point was to be dismissed.79
In general, the ATS is best understood as having been created as a
jurisdictional vehicle alone.80 Common law would provide a specific
cause of action for the few violations of international law that did carry
personal liability: offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe
conduct, and piracy.81
2. Mentions in the Early Twentieth Century
Though the Alien Tort Statute has been part of federal law since the
Judiciary Act of 1789, it was not often applied in contemporary cases,
despite seeming to provide a relatively broad mechanism for redress.82
It does not appear in the nineteenth century83 and was mentioned only
twice in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century.
The ATS’ first twentieth century appearance also marks its first
application beyond the scope of the high seas. In O’Reilly de Camara v.

course, arise.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (asserting that the ATS is purely
jurisdictional); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664
(2013) (affirming Sosa’s determination of the pure jurisdictionality of the ATS).
81. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (inferring from historical context that the ATS was intended to take
effect at the moment it was passed by relying on such common law causes of action, rather than
requiring additional legislation to provide causes of action).
82. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional scope of ATS).
The ATS would provide immediate and original jurisdiction for any crime against any foreign
official. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Furthermore, it would provide civil redress
against pirates and for other crimes on the high seas. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
Piracy was a clear and present danger at the time; the United States itself formally went to war
twice because of the threat pirates posed, in the First and Second Barbary Wars of 1801–05 and
1815, respectively. Given a problem prevalent enough to justify not one but two wars, one might
expect at least some litigation on point, but none exists.
83. At least, not in this Author’s research, though thorough research is no guarantee of
success. Cf. supra note 57 and accompanying text (Supreme Court’s omission of M’Grath in
recital of precedent).
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Brooke,84 the plaintiff was High Sheriff of Havana, Cuba, a position
that brought with it certain payments and rights.85 When the United
States occupied Cuba during the Spanish-American War,86 the military
governor of Havana revoked the office and its rights.87 The plaintiff
sued alleging deprivation of property, basing jurisdiction on the ATS
and the peace treaty with Spain, which had made the United States
Constitution legally effective during the occupation.88 The United
States subsequently passed a law validating all actions taken during the
occupation, including the plaintiff’s dismissal from office.89 The
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal with little thought;90 because the
validation authorized the act by law, it could hardly be a tort.91 The
plaintiff argued that her fundamental rights were violated, a contention
that the Court dismissed after finding Congress and the President agreed
on the appropriateness of the validating law.92
The second case, Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers’ International
Union,93 briefly brings up the ATS, disclaiming it as a potential source
of jurisdiction.94 In Khedivial, union members picketed a ship in New
York Harbor, the owners of which sued to enjoin the picketing.95 The
district court dismissed the owners’ suit because a specific federal law

84. 209 U.S. 45 (1908).
85. Including, curiously, that of being allowed to slaughter cattle within the city. Id. at 48–49.
86. Cuba, previously a Spanish colony, had earlier rebelled against Spain during the Ten
Years’ War (1868–78) and Little War (1879–80). Its third rebellion in 1895 would become
known as the Cuban War of Independence. A combination of American economic interests and
critical events, such as the infamous sinking of the U.S.S. Maine, precipitated intervention and
resulted in the Spanish-American War. See generally John L. Offner, McKinley and the SpanishAmerican War, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 50–61 (2004).
87. O’Reilly, 209 U.S. at 49. Removing local political appointees would not have been, and is
still not, an unusual action during a military occupation. The case does not give sufficient facts,
but if the plaintiff was a Spanish sympathizer, removal might have been inevitable.
88. Id.; see also Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, art. I, U.S.–Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 (also known as the Treaty of Paris).
89. O’Reilly, 209 U.S. at 49–50.
90. Id. at 50 (“We are so clearly of opinion [sic] that the complaint must be dismissed that we
shall not do more than mention some technical difficulties that would have to be discussed before
the plaintiff could succeed.”).
91. Id. at 51 (holding legalization of an act by definition barred a suit alleging the illegality of
that act).
92. What exactly these more fundamental rights were is unclear; the Court nevertheless
dismissed the argument. Id. (accepting joint Congressional and Presidential approval of the
legalization act as sufficient).
93. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
94. Id. at 51–52.
95. Id. at 50.
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barred injunctive relief.96 The Second Circuit affirmed on different
grounds: the specific law did not apply,97 but federal jurisdiction was
not otherwise available.98 The court considered and dismissed diversity
jurisdiction,99 federal question jurisdiction,100 and maritime tort
jurisdiction101 as potential bases for the action, before briefly
considering and dismissing the ATS, as the plaintiff neither alleged that
a treaty existed, nor that such picketing violated the law of nations.102
The court’s brief treatment, coupled with plaintiff’s failure to present
any evidence to support an ATS claim,103 implies that the possibility of
ATS jurisdiction was raised briefly, if at all, and was not given serious
consideration.104
The ATS did not play a significant role in either of the early
twentieth century cases: in O’Reilly there was no underlying tort, a
threshold requirement for any cause of action;105 in Khedivial, the
parties did not substantively argue the issue.106
C. The Modern Line of Cases
Following nearly two hundred years of obscurity,107 the Alien Tort

96. Id. at 50. The law at hand was the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 101
(2012), which prevents federal courts from granting injunctive relief against non-violent labor
disputes.
97. The plaintiffs did not adequately establish the events in question as constituting a “labor
dispute” within the meaning of the Norris-La Guardia Act. Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 51.
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id. (complaint did not allege diversity).
100. Id. (complaint did not allege a violation of federal antitrust regulations).
101. While the action was a maritime tort, the Supreme Court had recently affirmed the
position that a maritime tort could not support a grant of injunction in admiralty. Id. at 52; see
also Marine Cooks & Stewards, A.F.L. v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365, 368 n.5 (1960)
(because the Norris-LaGuardia Act prevents federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor
disputes, injunctions should not be permitted on alternate grounds, such as cases in admiralty).
102. Khedivial, 278 F.2d at 51–52.
103. The court only mentions that the plaintiff concedes that there is no treaty of free access,
and that furthermore the plaintiff presented “no precedents or arguments” regarding any right of
free access to harbors. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
104. The failure of the plaintiff to even argue that free access was a fundamental right
protected by the law of nations—much less present any evidence on point—implies that the ATS
was not seriously considered as a claim. Either that, or counsel was fatally unprepared at oral
argument; given plaintiff’s representation by a reputable New York firm, such seems unlikely.
Furthermore, the lack of “argument” on the issue indicates that it was not given serious
consideration. The issue was in all likelihood raised sua sponte by the court.
105. O’Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45, 51 (1908).
106. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing extent of ATS argumentation in
the case).
107. The earliest reference to any ATS-like language comes from the Articles of
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Statute was suddenly brought into the modern age in the Second
Circuit’s holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,108 which brought the ATS
up to date and gave it potential for relevance in the modern world.
Though a flurry of ATS litigation followed,109 the Supreme Court only
addressed the ATS in 2004, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,110 establishing
formal boundaries and guidelines in the wake of circuit confusion.
Though several cases have since defined other procedural boundaries of
the ATS,111 all modern ATS jurisprudence is based on the Sosa
framework.112 Given the drastic implications of expanded ATS
jurisdiction, the time had come for the Supreme Court to once again
weigh in on the matter, thus setting the stage for Kiobel.
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
In Filartiga,113 two citizens of Paraguay sued a former Paraguayan
police Inspector General, the alleged torturer of their son.114 They
asserted federal jurisdiction solely under the Alien Tort Statute.115 The
New York district court dismissed based on a strict interpretation of the
ATS, holding that the law of nations did not extend to a torture claim.116
This outcome was not surprising, given how rarely the ATS had been
used, much less upheld as conferring jurisdiction.117 The Second
Circuit’s reversal therefore paved the way for a new and modern
conceptualization of the ATS,118 which has since been firmly adopted in
spirit, if not in detail.119

Confederation, establishing a potential earliest date of 1781. The Filartiga decision, handed
down in 1980, came just one year shy of the ATS’ bicentennial.
108. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
109. Relative to five cases in 191 years, any cases would constitute a flurry.
110. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
111. See infra Part I.D (discussing procedural requirements applied to ATS).
112. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665
(2013) (affirming Sosa’s specific ruling and “specific, universal, and obligatory” test).
113. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
114. Id. at 878.
115. Id. at 880.
116. Id.
117. The last time jurisdiction under the ATS was upheld was in 1795 in Bolchos v. Darrel, 3
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). Even Bolchos was a case of parallel, rather than sole,
jurisdiction. See generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Bolchos).
118. Gary C. Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Implications of the Alien
Tort Statute, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 607, 610 (2004).
119. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (affirming modern applicability of
ATS but setting out guidelines to determine when jurisdiction under ATS is proper); see also
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (limiting
extraterritorial application of ATS doctrine).
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The Filartiga court made two principal rulings regarding aspects of
the ATS.120 Substantively, it held that torture was a violation of the law
of nations; procedurally, it reaffirmed that the ATS could grant
jurisdiction over actions that took place entirely abroad.121
The Second Circuit’s substantive determination that torture violated
the law of nations was the first expansion of the “law of nations”
language of the ATS.122 The court made this determination from a
comprehensive analysis of international jurisprudence on the issue.123 It
looked to the Charter of the United Nations,124 observing that, though
there existed disagreement as to what the Charter’s basic guarantees
include, no state questioned the right to be free from torture.125 The
court concluded there were few issues in contemporary law so
universally agreed upon as the limitation on a state’s power to torture
those under its control.126 The court bolstered its interpretation by
looking to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,127 the American
Convention on Human Rights,128 and explicit bans of torture in national
constitutions,129 including those of the United States130 and
Paraguay.131 It also referred to a State Department report articulating a

120. It also incidentally affirmed that the ATS was purely a jurisdictional statute, and did not
grant any new rights. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887; see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
121. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887, 890. The acts took place abroad, but both parties were present
in the United States; the plaintiffs had applied for and received political asylum, while the
defendant had entered on a visitor’s visa. Id. at 878. The defendant’s visa had expired, and he
was actually served with the complaint while in custody waiting for deportation. Id. at 878–89.
122. The only prior case, Khedivial, gave a cursory analysis and suggested that the law of
nations did not guarantee free access to harbors. See supra text accompanying note 102
(discussing Khedivial). It can be safely said that ATS jurisdiction had been materially
unmodified since its introduction.
123. See generally Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–85 (looking to international sources for defining
the law of nations).
124. Id. at 881; see also U.N. Charter art. 55.
125. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882.
126. Id. at 881 (finding public opinion is united on limitations on a state’s power to torture).
127. Id. at 882; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
128. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883–84. The United States has not signed the American
Convention on Human Rights, but it stands as an example of international consensus surrounding
torture. See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 5,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
129. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. See 48 Revue Internationale de Droit Penal Nos. 3 & 4, at
208 (1977) (survey of national constitutions’ torture provisions, concluding that more than fiftyfive nations explicitly ban torture).
130. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 n.13 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, which prohibits “cruel
and unusual punishments.”).
131. The actions that culminated in Filartiga took place in Paraguay. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
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general international recognition of the principle of freedom from
torture, which reached a similar conclusion.132 The prohibition against
torture was “clear and unambiguous” and therefore sufficient to
constitute a law of nations.133
The court then turned to jurisdiction, determining that the ATS can
have extraterritorial application.134 It started by noting it would not be
unusual for a court to adjudicate claims arising out of its jurisdiction
under the transitory torts doctrine.135 It concluded that, because the
ATS was properly authorized under Article III of the Constitution,136
and the law of nations has always been part of the federal common law,
federal jurisdiction over cases involving international law was clearly
established.137 The court was careful to note that this interpretation
granted no new rights, but merely established the ATS as a jurisdictional
vehicle for rights already recognized by international law, and thus the
federal common law.138
Filartiga ended on a note of clarification, asserting that the
reinterpretation of the ATS was intended to form it into a mechanism
through which to protect human rights.139 The court did so by
expanding the law of nations to account for the fact that “the torturer
has become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind,”140 thus drawing an explicit
connection to the language of the Constitution that authorizes the

884. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE PARAGUAY Aug. 25, 1967, art. 65, cl. 3 (Para.)
(outlawing torture and other cruel and inhuman behavior).
132. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884; see also J. L. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4–5 (1944) (concluding that states’ violations of norms of international law do not mean the
norms do not exist, nor does it diminish their effect; states may violate international norms as
individuals do national laws, but the violations have no bearing on the existence of the norms).
133. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884.
134. Id. at 885.
135. Id. To wit: a party may recover for torts “when the cause of action arose in another
civilized jurisdiction [if there exists] a well-founded belief that it was a cause of action in that
place.” Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912).
136. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 866; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also supra notes 42–50 and
accompanying text (discussing origin of ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was authorized
under the Offenses Clause).
137. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886–87.
138. Id. at 887.
139. Id. at 890.
140. Id. at 890. Both the emphasis and the punctuation are in the original; the Filartiga
opinion as transcribed in various online databases is often improperly cited. This eminently
quotable language is often found in subsequent ATS litigation. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J, concurring); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
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ATS.141
2. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Filartiga fundamentally changed the Alien Tort Statute, rendering it
suddenly relevant after nearly two hundred years of obscurity. In its
aftermath, courts continued to expand the ATS, sometimes significantly.
This rapid expansion was accompanied by correspondingly significant
consequences.142 It fueled fears that ATS litigation was developing into
a plaintiff’s market, threatening massive class actions against powerful
corporate and sovereign defendants.143 The Supreme Court first
weighed in on the matter in 2004 in Sosa, affirming the ATS as a purely
jurisdictional statute.144 The Court sketched a test to define violations
of the law of nations,145 and above all urged judicial caution in the
ATS’ application.146
In Sosa, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agent was
captured in Mexico, tortured, and murdered.147 The DEA had reason to
believe the defendant, Alvarez-Machain, was involved with the
crime.148 When extradition procedures subsequent to an arrest warrant
141. Congress would later sanction and formalize the Filartiga holding by passing the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)), an ATS-like statute crafted specifically to give victims of foreign torture
redress in American courts. While the TVPA was added to the ATS, it neither modified its
wording nor changed the ATS’ effect. The legislative context surrounding the TVPA’s passage
makes it quite clear that it was intended to supplement the ATS, rather than supplant it, by
providing concurrent jurisdiction in cases of torture. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991)
(Senate Committee on the Judiciary stating that, relative to TVPA, ATS has other important uses
and “should not be replaced”); H.R. REP. NO.102-367(I), at 4 (1991) (House Committee on the
Judiciary noting that TVPA intended to “enhance the remedy already available under [the
ATS]”).
142. See Hufbauer, supra note 118, at 610–11 (describing how, after Filartiga, some courts
held ATS to explicitly create causes of action under federal common law, and other courts were
receptive to expanding definition of the law of nations).
143. Id. at 614–15 (in section entitled “Pandora’s Box: Potential Damage to International
Commerce,” comparing potential trajectory of ATS litigation to that of asbestos, which “spawned
the largest mass tort litigation in legal history.”).
144. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713–14 (holding that the ATS was intended as jurisdictional; to argue
that the ATS creates causes of action is “simply frivolous”).
145. Id. at 724–25. In order to be cognizable, violations of the law of nations must be
“specific, universal, and obligatory.” Id. at 732 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
146. The term “caution” appears seven times in the Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 725 (“A series of reasons argue for judicial caution [when considering early common law
claims]”); id. at 727 (“[C]ollateral consequences . . . argue for judicial caution.”); id. at 728
(“These reasons argue for great caution in adapting the law of nations . . . .”).
147. Id. at 697–98.
148. Id.
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were fruitless, the DEA hired a group of Mexican citizens, including
Sosa, to capture him.149 The defendant was held for one night before
being flown to California, where he was arrested, charged, and
eventually acquitted for insufficient evidence.150 Alvarez-Machain then
sued Sosa asserting claims under, among other statutes,151 the ATS.152
The Court first discussed the ATS’ jurisdictionality, concluding it
was intended solely as a jurisdictional article.153 The Court reached this
conclusion by looking to the original text of the ATS, giving attention to
its placement in the Judiciary Act of 1789154—a statute otherwise
exclusively concerned with federal jurisdiction155—and two related
journal articles.156 If the ATS were purely jurisdictional, it could have
been argued that additional legislation was necessary to provide causes
of action.157 The Court disagreed, reasoning that, at the time of the
passage of the ATS, such causes of action would have been provided by
federal common law adopted from the moment of independence,158 and

149. Id. at 698.
150. Id. Alvarez-Machain successfully dismissed his criminal case on the grounds that his
seizure was in violation of a U.S.–Mexico extradition treaty. United States v. Alvarez-Machain,
504 U.S. 655, 658 (1992). The dismissal was affirmed on appeal, but the Supreme Court
reversed, reinstating the charges on the grounds that the mere fact of a forcible seizure did not
affect a federal court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 670. The case was tried on remand, and the district
court granted a motion for a directed verdict. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
151. Alvarez-Machain also sought a remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for
the DEA agents’ alleged wrongful arrest. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(2012) (permitting suits for wrongful arrest against government agents acting within the scope of
their employment). The FTCA claim was dismissed by the district court, but reinstated on appeal
by the Ninth Circuit. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001).
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed again, dismissing the FTCA claim on the grounds that the
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) does not apply to “any
claim arising in a foreign country.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 700–01.
152. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698–99. It bears note that the events in question took place in 1985, a
full nineteen years before the case reached the Supreme Court.
153. Id. at 713–14. Thus affirming the conclusion of Filartiga.
154. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
155. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
156. Id.; see also William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 479–80 (1986) (contending
that ATS “clearly” does not create a cause of action, and to argue otherwise would be “simply
frivolous”); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 689 (2002) (arguing that the ATS was
intended as jurisdictional in nature).
157. Such was the defendant’s argument. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
158. Id. at 714–15. This is not a new notion, and dates back to the very first cases addressing
the subject. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (opinion of Wilson, J.)
(“When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of
nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”).
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that furthermore those who drafted the ATS would have made that
assumption as well.159
The remaining question was then what sort of torts the ATS was
meant to encompass. The Court in Sosa inferred it was intended to
provide jurisdiction for a “modest” set of violations: offenses against
ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and prize captures and
piracy.160 The law of nations concerned itself with whole nations,161
while the ATS provided for individual relief, but the tension between
the individual and international scopes did not mean that no claims were
cognizable: the ATS provided jurisdiction for the few international law
violations that carried personal liability.162
The Court then turned to how best to understand violations of the law
of nations in a modern context. It concluded that, absent Congressional
modification to the ATS,163 any law of nations that could be enforced
under the ATS would need to be established through reliance on a norm
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with specificity comparable to the accepted eighteenth century
violations.164 The Court required a modern law of nations to be: (1)
specific, (2) universal, and (3) obligatory.165 Courts applying these
requirements would then have to moderate them by examining the
possible resulting practical effects of allowing such actions.166
Turning at last to Alvarez-Machain’s claim, the Court concluded that

159. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715–16 (finding the legislative intent behind the ATS was to have
federal common law provide causes of action); see also supra Part I.A (discussing historical
context of ATS).
160. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (ATS intended to provide vehicle for three causes of action); see
also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing how causes of action under the ATS were
already incorporated into British common law, and thus adopted by American federal common
law).
161. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720 (set of potential ATS claims limited by the national scope of the
law of nations); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 (1769) (“offences
again[s]t [the law of nations] are principally incident to whole [s]tates or nations”).
162. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
163. Such as the TVPA. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing TVPA’s
passage and effect).
164. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
165. Id. at 732–33 (quoting In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1994)). Sosa actually uses two phrasings of the test, the other being “violat[ion]s [of]
definable, universal and obligatory norms.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)). The “specific,
universal, and obligatory” language has, however, prevailed.
166. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33. Courts often keep practical considerations in mind, but the
Supreme Court here made a pragmatic analysis an explicit element.
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“arbitrary arrest” did not meet these standards.167 It did not find appeals
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights168 or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights169 compelling. Neither
document was binding according to United States jurisprudence,170 and
what propositions the documents did present were too abstract to
support a broad rule.171 Lastly, the Court commented that admitting
such litigation would create an incredibly and inappropriately broad
cause of action.172
The Court in Sosa set the bar fairly high; though the Supreme Court
has since readdressed the ATS, it only did so in Kiobel on more
fundamental grounds.173 Given the more prominent issues in other
areas of ATS jurisprudence,174 it might be some time until Sosa’s test to
interpret the law of nations is reviewed.
D. Procedural Requirements Read Into the ATS
Sosa addressed only the Alien Tort Statute insofar as it defined what
a cognizable law of nations violation was. Courts have since developed
a much broader package of ATS jurisprudence to address other

167. Id. at 735, 738.
168. Id. at 734; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 127, art. 5.
169. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–35; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 9, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175–76.
170. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734–35. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a declaration,
rather than a binding instrument; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is nonself-executing, and was never intended to create a private cause of action. See S. EXEC. REP. NO.
102-23 (1992) (understanding of Senate); David Kaye, State Execution of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 95, 96 (2013) (despite status as
treaty, ICCPR not incorporated into domestic law, and unavailable to courts).
171. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736 n.27 “[M]any nations recognize a norm against arbitrary detention,
but that consensus is at a high level of generality.”).
172. Id. at 736 (“[The] implications would be breathtaking. [Admitting arbitrary detention as
a violation of the law of nations] would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest,
anywhere in the world, unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place . . . .”).
The Court’s declaration is sweeping, but perhaps it overlooks other procedural checks such as
exhaustion. See Part I.D supra (discussing procedural requirements imposed on ATS claims).
173. Sosa looked to what constituted a violation of the law of nations, but Kiobel was
originally accepted to determine whether a corporation could be liable in the first place, and was
decided on the even more fundamental question of whether the ATS could even have
extraterritorial application. See infra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for
which cert. was granted in Kiobel).
174. One such issue is whether corporations may be liable—the question originally at issue in
Kiobel before the issue of extraterritoriality arose. Both corporate liability and extraterritoriality
are a priori to the Sosa factors, and it is unlikely that a case testing Sosa alone would reach the
Court in the near future.
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procedural issues.175 Because appellate review of the ATS is so
uncommon, many of these issues remain unresolved; they nevertheless
bear some mention to establish the bounds of ATS litigation.176
Though the text of the ATS enumerates no procedural
requirements,177 several have been inferred, including both a
requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and application of a
statute of limitations.178 The Supreme Court briefly touched on
exhaustion in Sosa,179 noting that requiring the exhaustion of domestic
remedies as a prerequisite for seeking international ones could be
considered a principle of international law180 and suggesting that
exhaustion could be considered as a requirement.181 Courts have been
generally receptive to an exhaustion requirement, and the Ninth Circuit
has established a framework within which to evaluate exhaustion as an
affirmative defense.182 While Sosa does not discuss a statute of
limitations applicable to ATS jurisprudence, courts have applied a tenyear statute to the ATS by analogy to the explicit statute provided for
within the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”).183 As with all
175. As discussed in this section, these requirements can include exhaustion, statutes of
limitations, effects of state action, the nature of the parties, and the underlying tort.
Extraterritoriality, the issue at the heart of Kiobel, is dealt with in Part I.E infra.
176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (“Because appellate review of ATS suits has been
so uncommon, there remain a number of unresolved issues lurking in our ATS jurisprudence—
issues that we have simply had no occasion to address.”).
177. At thirty-three words, the text of the ATS does not go into great detail on much of
anything. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (full text of ATS).
178. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 704 (2004) (recognizing that causes of action
barred in a foreign jurisdiction by a statute of limitations will generally be barred domestically).
This does not explicitly establish a domestic statute for ATS claims, but implies recognition of
foreign statutes as a possibility.
179. Id. at 722 n.21 (discussion of exhaustion in a footnote).
180. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 472–81 (6th ed.
2003). TVPA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) requires claimants to exhaust “adequate and
available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”
181. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (Court “would certainly consider” the appropriateness of an
exhaustion requirement in a future case).
182. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 550 F.3d 822, 831–33 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit here
explicitly follows guidelines set out in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law. Id. at 832; see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 703 cmt. d. (1987) (allowing a state to
pursue formal remedies only after a claimant of a human rights violation “has exhausted available
remedies under the domestic law of the accused state”). Worth noting is that the Restatement
itself was specifically modeled on the doctrinal holdings of Filartiga. Ernest A. Young,
Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public Law Litigation after
Kiobel 14 (Mar. 14, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2409838.
183. TVPA § 2(c); see, e.g., Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778 (11th Cir. 2005) (asserting
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statutes of limitations, equitable tolling is applicable.184
The ATS is fairly clear about which parties have standing to sue for
relief, but it is less clear on the nature of the defendant. A party seeking
relief under the ATS must be, as a threshold matter, an alien.185 Alien
status is determined solely through citizenship—neither residency186
nor custodial status187 is relevant. The nature of the defendant is less
clear-cut, posing two main issues: (1) what effect, if any, does a claim
of state action have on a defendant;188 and (2) whether a corporate
defendant can be liable.189 Circuit confusion and disagreement on a
requirement of state action likely stem from the TVPA, where state
action is explicitly required—that is, that individuals must be acting
under the color of state law.190
As the ATS contains no explicit state action requirement, federal
courts have taken different approaches to the subject. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that state action is generally required under the ATS,
but that war crimes are exceptional and do not require such a

(incorrectly) that ATS and TVPA are both subject to a ten-year statute of limitations provided for
in TVPA).
184. Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding insufficient
showing by plaintiff to justify equitably tolling the statute of limitations for an ATS claim that
was delayed by twenty-two years).
185. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (emphasis added). Quite plainly, “[a] district court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction under the ATS if the plaintiff is not an alien.” Weisskopf v. United
Jewish Appeal–Fed’n of Jewish Philanthropies of N.Y., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921–22 (S.D.
Tex. 2012); see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 255
(2d Cir. 2009) (alien nature of plaintiff meets one of three requirements to state an ATS claim).
186. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that permanent
resident alien qualifies as alien); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–89 (2d Cir. 1980)
(allowing ATS suit by resident alien).
187. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473–74 (2004) (reversing precedent to hold that aliens
detained abroad have standing to sue for habeas relief).
188. Specifically, whether a defendant must be acting under color of state action, whether it
must not be acting under such state action, or whether a state action analysis is irrelevant to
individual liability.
189. As Kiobel was decided on the procedural issue of extraterritoriality, the issue of
corporate liability is still largely unresolved. See, e.g., Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794,
2013 WL 4564646, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (concluding that, because the Supreme Court
affirmed Kiobel, until the Supreme Court or Second Circuit en banc repudiates it, the Second
Circuit’s Kiobel holding still bars corporate liability within the Second Circuit).
190. To be liable under the TVPA, an individual must act “under actual or apparent authority,
or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . .” TVPA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also
Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s
grant of summary judgment on TVPA claims but not ATS claims, because a lack of state action
did not affect ATS requirements).
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showing.191 The Ninth Circuit does not recognize such an exception,
requiring state action to entertain claims of crimes against humanity.192
The District of Columbia Circuit also requires state action; while it does
not categorically bar ATS suits against nonstate actors,193 if state action
is not alleged, the plaintiff must demonstrate that an international
consensus on individual liability for the action exists.194 By contrast,
the Second Circuit held that the law of nations does not apply solely to
state action;195 while torture and summary execution are only violations
if carried out under the color of state law,196 genocide197 and war
crimes198 carry individual liability. The Fifth Circuit has declined to
consider the issue.199
Corporate liability is also an area of significant ambiguity,200 and the

191. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on
different grounds, Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012) (“Some
acts, such as torture and murder committed in the course of war crimes, violate the law of nations
regardless of whether the perpetrator acted under color of law of a foreign nation or only as a
private individual.”). Under this interpretation, plaintiffs must either argue state action or fit their
claims under the “war crimes exception.” Id. at 1267.
192. Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 2008). At least one
judge, however, disagrees, asserting that “genocide and war crimes do not require state action,”
without indication that the point is contentious. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 786 n.4
(9th Cir. 2011) (McKeown, J., concurring), vacated in light of Kiobel, Rio Tinto P.L.C. v. Sarei,
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.), dismissed on other grounds, Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 722 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal in light of Kiobel).
193. Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“A categorical bar
of ATS suits against nonstate actors would be at odds with Sosa . . . .”).
194. Id.
195. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
196. Id. at 243 (“[T]orture and summary execution . . . are proscribed by international law
only when committed by state officials or under color of law.”). If such acts are perpetrated in
the course of genocide or war crimes, however, state action is no longer required. Id. The
purpose of the “state action” inquiry is to find whether the defendant exceeded standards of
civilized conduct, rather than draw a connection with a sovereign. As a result, meeting the “state
action” threshold only requires showing a semblance of official authority. Id. at 232.
197. “[T]he proscription of genocide has applied equally to state and non-state actors.” Id. at
241–42.
198. “The liability of private individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized since
World War I and was confirmed at Nuremberg after World War II . . . .” Id. at 239.
199. In its most recent pronouncement on the issue, the Fifth Circuit held that “we need not
address whether state-action is required to sustain an action for individual human rights violation
under the ATS.” Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1999).
200. And unusually so, as corporate liability is generally widely-accepted in other areas of the
law. “A legal culture long accustomed to imposing liability on corporations may, at first blush,
assume that corporations must be subject to tort liability under the ATS . . . .” Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 569 U.S. —, 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel to consider that issue.201
Most circuits had either held or assumed corporations were subject to
liability under the ATS;202 only the Second Circuit disagreed, rejecting
corporate liability as having no grounding in the law of nations.203 As
the Supreme Court did not reach the issue in Kiobel, the split remains
unresolved.
Setting aside questions of who may be liable under the ATS, there
remains uncertainty as to what valid defendants may be liable for. The
Sosa formulation provided guidance on which torts were covered under
the law of nations, allowing for “[a] modest number of international law
violations,”204 but not defining any new ones. Modern courts have
recognized several potential violations. The paradigmatic tort is that of
torture, confirmed in Filartiga.205
Courts have further upheld
jurisdiction in cases of extrajudicial killings,206 modern piracy,207
201. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663; see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 565 U.S. —,
132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (mem.) (grant of certiorari).
202. The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits currently
recognize corporate liability. See Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation
Soc’y, 725 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that “[y]ou don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch” to
be a pirate, ruling for plaintiff without comment as to corporate nature of defendant); Flomo v.
Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (7th Cir. 2011) (ruling that corporations
are liable where the violations are directed, encouraged, or condoned by corporate
decisionmakers); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that ATS provides no exception for corporate defendants); Herero People’s Reparations Corp. v.
Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (ruling without comment as to corporate
nature of defendant in a suit between corporations); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d
161, 163 (5th Cir. 1999) (ruling on ATS claim, without comment as to corporate nature of
defendant).
203. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (holding that international law rejects corporate liability, so ATS
jurisdiction does not encompass corporate defendants). Interestingly enough, the Second Circuit
had previously upheld an ATS claim against a corporate defendant—the same corporate
defendant as in Kiobel. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2000),
repudiated by Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (reinstating ATS claim against corporation on grounds that
corporate office in New York was sufficient for personal jurisdiction).
204. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
205. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Congress recognized torture as
a violation of the law of nations by granting torture a sort of permanent pass by passing the
TVPA, which independently provides protections and remedies to torture victims.
206. The TVPA provides a concurrent remedy for victims of extrajudicial killings. TVPA §
2(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). If the ATS’ requirements are met, then it provides concurrent
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316 (noting that ATS provides concurrent remedy to
TVPA for extrajudicial killings, if “committed in violation of the law of nations”).
207. Inst. of Cetacean Research, 725 F.3d at 942.
You don’t need a peg leg or an eye patch. When you ram ships; hurl glass containers
of acid; drag metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage propellers and rudders;
launch smoke bombs and flares with hooks; and point high-powered lasers at other
ships, you are, without a doubt, a pirate, no matter how high-minded you believe your
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human trafficking and forced labor,208 and aiding and abetting
liability.209 Courts have found that acts of terrorism alone210 do not
constitute a violation of the law of nations.211 A district court in the
Northern District of California has even entertained disclosure of
electronic information as a potentially actionable ATS claim.212
Due to the scarcity of modern appellate review of the ATS, some
discrepancies have been resolved,213 but many have not, leaving much
room for rulings of first impression to accumulate.
E. The Requirement of Extraterritoriality
Though the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Kiobel to consider
corporate liability, the case was ultimately decided on the threshold
question of whether the Alien Tort Statute could have extraterritorial
effect, an application that most jurisdictions had previously accepted.
As with corporate liability,214 several courts have either explicitly
found or implicitly assumed extraterritorial application of the ATS to be
permissible.215 While some courts have explicitly upheld the ATS’
purpose to be.
Id.
208. Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 687 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (finding that
trafficking and forced labor qualify as international norms under Sosa, and are therefore
actionable under ATS).
209. Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 395–96 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated in light of Kiobel, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
527 Fed. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mem.)) (concluding that “virtually every court” after Sosa has
recognized accessorial liability for violations of international law).
210. As with the Second Circuit’s holding on torture relative to genocide. See Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding torture without state action not actionable
under ATS, but may be actionable if part of a larger act of genocide).
211. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1321–22 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(terrorism is not based on a sufficiently accepted, established, or defined international norm so as
to constitute a violation of the law of nations).
212. Zheng v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. C-08-1068 MMC, 2009 WL 4430297, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 2, 2009) (concluding that, where plaintiff filed suit for unlawful disclosure of private
electronic communication, the claim “as pleaded” could be interpreted as alleging an ATS
violation).
213. For example, Kiobel’s test may have helped to clarify when and under what conditions
terrorism may be actionable under the ATS. Compare Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, No. 10-483 RCL, 2013 WL 4427943, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (holding
that Hezbollah rocket attacks injuring American civilians in Israel did not sufficiently touch and
concern the United States), with Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013)
(finding that a terrorist attack on an American embassy in Afghanistan touched and concerned the
United States to be actionable under ATS).
214. See supra text accompanying note 202 (listing numerous precedents in support of
corporate liability).
215. Note that extraterritorial application of state tort law, as opposed to the law of nations, is
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extraterritorial application,216 others have done so implicitly, applying
the ATS in extraterritorial contexts.217 Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question directly, holding the
ATS capable of extraterritorial application.218 He noted not only that all
precedent was in favor of extraterritorial application, but also that courts
had used the ATS extraterritorially since its creation.219 Furthermore,
denying extraterritorial application would render the statute
“superfluous,” given the extensive domestic remedies already in place
for the torts it would otherwise cover.220
Issuing extraterritorial injunctions under ATS jurisdiction is a more
difficult matter, with outcomes determined more by the practicality of
enforcing injunctive relief abroad than any specific doctrine. The
Second Circuit has held that applying injunctive relief within a foreign
country is improper, largely because of the difficulty of enforcement:
such an order would take effect both well outside of the court’s
jurisdiction and infringe the sovereignty of a foreign state.221
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has upheld extraterritorial injunctive relief
in international waters, where no foreign state was present to complicate
matters.222

generally and uncontroversially barred. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205,
230–31 (4th Cir. 2012) (presumption of extraterritoriality applies to Virginia tort law).
216. See, e.g., Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d
689, 694 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that, since Congress generally has authority to apply its laws
extraterritorially, consistent with principles of international law, ATS may be applied to
extraterritorial actions); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding ATS can be applied extraterritorially as long as it fulfills the Sosa requirements of
meeting a definite and universal international law norm); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1157 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding claims under the ATS to be explicitly
extraterritorial in nature).
217. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding ATS
jurisdiction proper where torture took place in Paraguay). For an extension of this principle, see
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D.D.C. 2005) (accepting acts under color of
law that would expand extraterritorial reach of ATS, implicitly accepting that ATS has
extraterritorial reach); see also John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003–04
(S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that, because acts were extraterritorial, normal federal law does not
apply, and plaintiffs must proceed under the ATS, implicitly accepting that the ATS has
extraterritorial application).
218. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
219. Id.
220. Id. (reasoning that, if ATS was not extraterritorially applicable, it would serve no
purpose, given extensive domestic remedies for eligible torts).
221. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104, 124 (2d
Cir. 2008) (determining that an extraterritorial injunction to be enforced in Vietnam would be
“wholly impracticable,” given the court’s lack of jurisdiction and Vietnam’s sovereignty).
222. Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc., 725 F.3d 940, 946–47
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The core modern interpretation of the ATS—that aliens may sue in
American courts to recover for violations of the law of nations—has
remained largely unchanged since Filartiga. The Court previously
addressed the limits of ATS jurisprudence by setting out the limits of
the law of nations in Sosa, setting out a fairly definite standard.223 It is
against this background that the Supreme Court took up the case of
Kiobel to address finer-grained procedural details: corporate liability
and, on rehearing, extraterritorial application.
II. DISCUSSION
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum224 came before the Court on two
different rounds of oral arguments: the first on corporate liability, and
the second on the threshold issue of extraterritorial application.225 The
Court’s decision was unanimous, but between the majority and three
separate concurrences, the various Justices’ rationales differed
greatly.226
A. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
The Kiobel plaintiffs filed suit against the Royal Dutch Petroleum
Company, alleging it aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
violating the law of nations. The debate in lower courts centered on
corporate liability, though the Supreme Court ultimately ruled on the
threshold issue of extraterritoriality.
1. Factual Background
The plaintiffs were Nigerian residents of Ogoniland, an area in the
Niger Delta.227 Defendant Royal Dutch Petroleum228 had been active in
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 45 (E.D.N.Y.
2005)) (issuing an injunction against piracy, enforceable in international waters, where comity did
not apply, and U.S. did not recognize foreign claims of sovereignty over waters).
223. See supra Part I.C.2 (discussing Sosa).
224. 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
225. Id. at 1663.
226. Compare infra Part II.B (discussing opinion of the majority), with infra Part III.C
(discussing concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy), III.D (discussing concurring opinion of
Justice Alito), and III.E (discussing concurring opinion of Justice Breyer).
227. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
228. Commonly known as Shell. The suit was first filed on September 20, 2002 against Royal
Dutch Petroleum and Shell Transport and Trading; the actions alleged were attributed to Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd., a jointly owned subsidiary of the two named
defendants. Id.; Joint Appendix at 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S.
Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6425353, at *1. In 2005, Royal Dutch and Shell
Transport merged into Royal Dutch Shell. 1980s to the new millennium, SHELL GLOBAL,
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Nigeria since 1937, and had exported oil therefrom since 1958.229 The
plaintiffs alleged that, after Ogoniland residents started protesting the
environmental effects of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s activities in the early
1990s, Royal Dutch Petroleum requested and received aid from the
Nigerian government in suppressing the protests.230 The suppression
was violent, and the plaintiffs alleged that Nigerian military and police
forces attacked villages; engaged in beatings, rapes, and killings;
illegally arrested village residents; and looted and destroyed property.231
The plaintiffs also alleged that Royal Dutch Petroleum aided and
abetted Nigerian governmental forces by providing food, transportation,
payment, some material support, and by letting Nigerian forces use
Royal Dutch Petroleum’s property as a staging ground for attacks.232
The plaintiffs subsequently moved to the United States and received
political asylum.233
2. Procedural Developments
Kiobel was first filed in the Southern District of New York in
September 2002, putatively as a class action.234 Seven counts were
brought under ATS jurisdiction: extrajudicial killings, crimes against
humanity, torture, arbitrary arrest, violation of the right to life, forced
exile, and destruction of property.235 The district court, relying on the
recently-issued Sosa opinion, granted summary judgment for the
defendants on the claims of extrajudicial killings, right to life, forced
exile, and property destruction.236 Judge Kimba Wood did, however,
certify the denial of summary judgment on the remaining claims for
interlocutory appeal,237 noting in particular her concern of whether

http://www.shell.com/global/aboutshell/who-we-are/our-history/1980s-to-new-century.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2014).
229. See Shell at a glance, SHELL NIGERIA (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.shell.com.ng/
aboutshell/at-a-glance.html (discussing Shell’s operations in Nigeria); see also Joint
Appendix, supra note 228, at *59, *98 (discussing length and nature of Shell’s operations in
Nigeria).
230. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 228, at *43.
231. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662; see also Joint Appendix, supra note 228, at *44–54.
232. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. “Material support” of an unspecified nature was alleged in
the amended complaint, Joint Appendix, supra note 228, at *43, but did not appear in the
Supreme Court’s listing of grievances.
233. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663. As resident aliens, they were eligible to file under the ATS.
See supra note 186 (resident aliens normally qualify as aliens for purposes of ATS jurisdiction).
234. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
235. Joint Appendix, supra note 228, at *80–87.
236. Kiobel, 456 F. Supp. 2d. at 464–67 (dismissing counts under Sosa test).
237. Id. at 467–68.
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aiding and abetting liability was permissible post-Sosa.238
On appeal, the Second Circuit sidestepped the individual claims and
turned to the threshold issue of whether ATS claims could be properly
brought against a corporate defendant.239 The court found that, though
corporate liability for torts might be common in a domestic context,240 a
fresh review was necessary to determine whether corporations could be
liable for torts under customary international law.241 In that context, the
court did not find any such norm of corporate liability, and so it held
that ATS jurisdiction could not extend to sustaining actions against
corporations.242 The Second Circuit therefore affirmed in part and
reversed in part to dismiss all claims.243
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the law of
nations recognized corporate liability.244 At the first oral argument,
counsel for petitioner barely finished two sentences before Justice
Kennedy raised the issue of extraterritorial application, an issue that
permeated the rest of the oral discussion.245 One week later, the Court
examined another ATS case, Rio Tinto P.L.C. v. Sarei, wherein the
Ninth Circuit held that the ATS did have extraterritorial application.246

238. Id. at 468 n.14 (noting that it is “particularly unclear” whether aiding and abetting
liability can survive the tests outlined in Sosa); cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–
33 n.20 (2004) (questioning whether private actors can be liable under the ATS, and urging courts
to consider the practical effect of allowing claims).
239. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other
grounds, 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013); see also supra notes 200–203 and accompanying
text (discussing corporate liability and reviewing other circuit precedent).
240. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117–18 (substantive law in the court’s jurisdiction may lead one way,
but such is not applicable to issues of customary international law).
241. Id. at 118.
242. Id. at 118–20. The issue is not, strictly speaking, “immunity” from ATS suits; rather,
corporations are simply not liable for such violations in the first place. Id. at 120.
243. Id. at 149. It bears note that one judge concurred solely in the judgment and filed a
separate concurrence on different grounds, presaging the Supreme Court’s opinion. Kiobel, 621
F.3d at 149–96 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Leval found denial of corporate
liability without precedent, id. at 151, but agreed that dismissal was proper on the basis that the
pleadings could not support aiding and abetting liability, as the plaintiffs did not allege that Royal
Dutch Petroleum acted with the purpose of aiding human rights abuses, id. at 153–54.
244. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013); see
also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 565 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (mem.) (grant of
certiorari).
245. Oral Argument at 00:40, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No.
10-1491), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2011/2011_10_1491/argument; see
Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Downhill, from the start, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 28, 2012, 3:05
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/argument-recap-downhill-from-the-start (analyzing the
oral arguments in Kiobel).
246. Rio Tinto P.L.C. v. Sarei, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); see Sarei v. Rio Tinto
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Rather than issue a Kiobel ruling on corporate liability and immediately
readdress the ATS in Sarei, the Court expanded the scope of Kiobel,247
directing parties to file supplemental briefs on the extraterritoriality
issue and setting the case for reargument.248
Addressing the ATS directly for the first time since Sosa, the Court
sidestepped the question of corporate liability and turned to the
threshold issue as to whether ATS claims could be properly brought for
actions taking place within the territory of a foreign sovereign.249
Though the Court unanimously affirmed the Second Circuit, the
rationales of the individual Justices varied: three separate concurring
opinions accompanied the five-member majority.
B. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined.250 The majority
held that the presumption against extraterritoriality applied to the ATS,
and that the present claims did not displace that presumption.251
After a brief summary of the factual and procedural history of the
case, the Court reviewed the lengthy history of the ATS.252 The Court
then reframed the question presented as not whether the ATS claim was
properly stated pursuant to the Sosa test, but whether such a claim could
cover events that happened on the soil of a foreign sovereign state.253
The Court then provided a recital of the presumption against
extraterritorial application of statutes, holding that the presumption
applied to the ATS.254 Relying on its holding in Morrison v. National

P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 744–47 (9th Cir. 2011) (extraterritoriality is no bar to applying the ATS).
Kiobel functionally reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which was dismissed on remand. Sarei
v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013).
247. Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be expanded and reargued, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012,
2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/kiobel-to-be-reargued (analyzing the close
proximity of the arrival of Rio Tinto with the oral argument and order for rehearing in Kiobel).
248. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
249. The question as properly presented: “[w]hether and under what circumstances the [ATS]
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within
the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
250. Id. at 1662 (majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito).
251. Id. at 1669.
252. Id. at 1662–63; see also supra Parts I.A–B (outlining history of the ATS); supra Part I.C
(discussing Filartiga and Sosa).
253. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
254. Id. at 1665.
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Australia Bank,255 the Court reaffirmed that, where there is no
indication in a statute that it has extraterritorial application, it has
none.256 The presumption against extraterritoriality was intended to
prevent unintentional clashes between the laws of the United States and
those of other nations.257 The Court took special note that international
relations lie within the domain of the political branches, and so any
extraterritorial effect would need to be clearly expressed by Congress in
the statute in question.258 The Court noted that, though the presumption
was usually applied to acts that regulate conduct abroad,259 and the ATS
is a purely jurisdictional statute,260 the ATS’ underlying principles of
international effect were similar enough to justify cross-application.261
Such an application was particularly appropriate given Sosa’s
exhortations to judicial caution.262
Moving to the ATS itself, the Court concluded that nothing in its text
or history rebutted the presumption against extraterritorial
application.263 The language of the statute did not evince a clear
indication of extraterritorial application.264 Furthermore, the Court
determined that plaintiff’s reliance on the transitory torts doctrine265
was misplaced: the ATS did not permit a cause of action under foreign
law directly, but instead permitted a cause of action under U.S. law to
enforce an international norm.266 As the cause of action was therefore

255. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
256. The Kiobel Court noted that “‘[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none . . . .’” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Morrison, 561
U.S. at 255).
257. The presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and
those of other nations which could result in international discord.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664
(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
258. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664; see also Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S.
138, 146–47 (1957) (asserting that the judiciary should not “run interference” in the field of
international relations without a clearly expressed affirmative intention of Congress to that end).
259. See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258–59 (stating Title VII has no extraterritorial effect,
despite potential non-domestic application).
260. As held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
261. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
262. Id. at 1664–65; see also supra note 146 (discussing Sosa’s emphasis on the need for
judicial caution in applying the ATS).
263. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665.
264. Id. at 1666. The term “any civil action” was not sufficient; the Court noted that such
generic terms were not sufficient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. at 1665.
See, e.g., Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248–49 (boilerplate terms like “commerce” or “employer” do not
suffice to displace presumption against extraterritoriality).
265. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (formal definition of doctrine).
266. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666.
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wholly domestic, the transitory torts doctrine could not apply.267
The Court then discussed the historical background of the ATS in
some depth.268 It concluded that, if anything, the ATS was enacted to
provide jurisdiction for such actions as assaults on ambassadors269 and
wrongful seizures of property from ships in United States territorial
waters,270 and therefore did not apply to claims arising from actions in
foreign territory.271 While piracy on the high seas was also within the
explicit contemplation of the ATS,272 and conduct on the high seas has
generally been treated the same as foreign soil for the purposes of
extraterritorial application,273 pirates were a category sui generis, as
they traditionally did not operate within any jurisdiction.274 Because
applying the ATS to conduct on the high seas would not generally
infringe another nation’s sovereignty, such application would run fewer
foreign policy risks that would otherwise justify applying a presumption
against extraterritoriality.275
Finally, in looking to the purpose of the ATS, the Court did not find
that it was explicitly passed to provide a forum for the enforcement of
international norms so as to override the presumption against

The question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a
cause of action provided by foreign or even international law. The question is instead
whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to enforce
a norm of international law.
Id.
267. Id. at 1665–66.
268. Id. at 1666–69; see also supra Parts I.A–B (discussing historical context of the ATS).
269. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666–68; see supra Part I.A and notes 34–41 and accompanying
text (providing an overview of the 1784 and 1787 assaults in question).
270. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17
F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895); see also Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (discussing the two
cases as examples of seizures occurring within US territorial waters); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing
the Moxon and Bolchos cases). The Court does not mention M’Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas.
128 (D.S.C. 1794) (No. 8809), a parallel case where the ATS was used to provide jurisdiction for
enforcement of an action that took place in foreign territorial waters. See supra note 57 and
accompany text (discussing the Court’s omission of M’Grath); see also supra Part I.B.1
(discussing M’Grath).
271. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (finding no historical support for foreign application of ATS).
272. Id.; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text (concluding that ATS would provide
jurisdiction for piracy).
273. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667; see, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
173–74 (applying presumption of extraterritoriality a treaty for conduct on high seas).
274. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667. See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*71 (1769) (allowing pirate prosecution by any nation).
275. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (applying ATS to piracy doesn’t impose the United States’
sovereign will on acts occurring within jurisdiction of another sovereign).
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extraterritoriality.276 The ATS was a means of relief for foreign
officials wronged within the United States, rather than an extension of
jurisdiction to cover conduct in foreign countries.277 A contrary
interpretation would, if anything, create more problems than it solved;
the Court referred to a number of nations that had objected to recent
extraterritorial applications of the ATS.278
The Court concluded that none of the conduct in the case took place
within the United States’ jurisdiction.279 It held that to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application, ATS “claims [must]
touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”280
Mere corporate presence of the defendant within the United States was
not sufficient to displace the presumption.281 More pointedly, if
Congress wanted to extend the ATS to extraterritorial applications, it
would be required to enact a specific statute.282
C. Concurring Opinion: Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court and additionally filed
a concurring opinion.283 He noted that the majority opinion left several
significant questions still open.284 In his view, this was “a proper
disposition,”285 as the Torture Victim Protection Act already provided a
mechanism for redress in several alleged violations of international
customary law.286 He accepted that ATS jurisprudence was far from
complete, concluding that future cases arising outside the scope of the

276. Id. at 1668 (“implausible to suppose” that First Congress, concerned with any recognition
of the United States, intended to provide a forum for enforcing international norms).
277. Id. at 1668–69.
278. Id. at 1669 (citing Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)) (listing objections to ATS by, inter alia, Canada, Germany,
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
279. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
280. Id.
281. Id. In this case, the presence consisted of an office in New York City. See Joint
Appendix, supra note 228, at *55.
282. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. This is likely a reference to the TVPA, which supplemented
the ATS by providing jurisdiction for claims of torture. See supra text accompanying note 141
(discussing TVPA).
283. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also TVPA §§ 2(a)–(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing jurisdiction for
claims of torture).
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majority’s ruling or the TVPA will require further explanation.287
D. Concurring Opinion: Justice Alito
Justice Alito also joined the Court’s opinion and filed a concurrence,
which Justice Thomas joined.288 Like Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito
recognized that the majority’s “touch and concern” formulation “leaves
much unanswered,”289 and set out a broader approach that nevertheless
set forth a similar standard.290
Relying on Morrison, Justice Alito argued that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should bar claims unless the event that was the
“focus of Congressional concern” in the statute took place within the
United States.291 The Court’s holding in Sosa made it clear that, when
the ATS was passed, Congressional concern was focused on violations
of safe conduct, infringement of ambassadors’ rights, and piracy.292
Causes of action under the ATS should therefore be barred by the
presumption against extraterritoriality, unless that domestic conduct
violated an international law norm sufficient to meet the Sosa
requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.293
As none of the acts in Kiobel took place domestically, under this
formulation the presumption against extraterritoriality would apply to
bar the claim.294
E. Concurring Opinion: Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer filed a concurrence, which Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.295 Justice Breyer’s reasoning differed

287. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy’s opinion is
deliberately vague, leaving open the door for further analysis and judicial developments without
expressing an opinion as to which direction those developments should take. See Oona
Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign squared” cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-comm
entary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (characterizing Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence as “deliberately (maddeningly) vague”).
288. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring).
289. “[The majority’s] formulation obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is
wisdom in the Court’s preference for this narrow approach.” Id.
290. Id. at 1670.
291. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)).
292. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (no reason to suspect First Congress had any torts in mind other than
Blackstone’s three primary offenses regarding safe conducts, ambassador’s rights, and piracy).
293. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1670–78 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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fundamentally from that of the majority and Justice Alito in that he did
not invoke the presumption against extraterritoriality at all, finding that
the presumption does not apply to the ATS.296 He instead set out a
three-part test for finding jurisdiction under the ATS.297
Justice Breyer began by framing the Kiobel case as a successor to
Sosa.298 Sosa functionally reaffirmed the ATS’ modern relevance,
“essentially lead[ing] today’s judges to ask: Who are today’s
pirates?”299 Sosa provided a framework limiting claims to those similar
in specificity and character to piracy;300 Kiobel addressed the subset of
claims arising from activities abroad.301
Addressing the majority’s stance, Justice Breyer discussed how the
presumption against extraterritoriality did not apply well to the ATS.302
The specific presumption rested on a general fundamental presumption
that Congress normally legislates on domestic, as opposed to foreign,
matters.303 The ATS, however, was enacted with “foreign matters” in
mind304: it explicitly referred to “alien[s],” “treat[ies],” and the “law of
nations,”305 and its purpose was to address actions that had potential
consequences in the international arena.306
One of the three torts that does fall within the ATS’ scope—piracy—
normally takes place abroad.307 The majority dismissed this by

296. Id. at 1672 (noting ATS explicitly passed with foreign affairs in mind, so presumption
does not apply).
297. Id. at 1671.
298. Id. at 1671–72.
299. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004) (allowing courts to recognize claims based on modern violations of
the law of nations).
300. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (allowing ATS claims based on modern norms of international
character that are universal and sufficiently specific to the originally cognized ATS claims such
as piracy).
301. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671–72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 1672.
303. Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
304. Id.
305. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (providing district courts with “original jurisdiction
of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States).
306. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that the purpose of ATS was
to address law of nations violations by offering a remedy for activities “threatening serious
consequences in international affairs” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715
(2004)).
307. Id.; see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *72 (1769) (defining piracy as
taking place abroad).
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emphasizing that piracy takes place on the high seas,308 but Justice
Breyer noted that piracy takes place on a ship, an environment that falls
within the jurisdiction of the nation of its registry.309 The majority
stated that applying United States law to pirates does not apply the
United States’ sovereign will to the territorial jurisdiction of another
country,310 but because a ship is within the territorial sovereignty of
another nation, the distinction is one without a difference.311 If pirates
were indeed “fair game” wherever caught, then the purpose of the ATS
would be to target modern pirates as outlined by Sosa.312
Addressing the ATS directly, Justice Breyer assumed that Congress
intended the ATS’ jurisdictional grant to extend as far as its substantive
reach,313 and looked to the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
to determine the scope of that reach.314 Under the Restatement, any
extension of jurisdiction must be reasonable.315 Subject to this general
requirement, a state may apply its law to conduct within its territory,316
activities and interests of its citizens outside its territory,317 conduct
outside its territory intended to have a substantial effect within its
territory,318 and conduct outside its territory directed against state
security regardless of the actor.319 Under the Restatement, states also
have explicit jurisdiction to define and punish offenses recognized by
nations as being of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trading, and
war crimes.320

308. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667 (finding that piracy occurs on the high seas, beyond the
jurisdiction of any country).
309. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that ships are the jurisdiction of the
country whose flag they fly); see also United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632
(1818) (holding that ships sailing under the flag of a foreign government fall under that
government’s jurisdiction).
310. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
311. Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring).
312. Id. at 1673 (enemies of mankind should be punished wherever found, so nations do not
harbor them; Sosa outlines a test for determining what and who modern enemies of mankind are).
313. Id.
314. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (1987).
315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (stating that a state may not
exercise jurisdiction where it is unreasonable to do so).
316. Id. § 402(1)(a–b).
317. Id. § 402(2).
318. Id. § 402(1)(c).
319. Id. § 402(3).
320. Id. § 404. These offenses of “universal concern” include piracy, slave trade, hijacking
aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and some types of terrorism, even if there is no jurisdiction based
on a specific provision of § 402.
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Viewing these bases in light of the basic purposes of Sosa321 and the
ATS,322 Justice Breyer proposed that ATS jurisdiction should exist
where the tort occurred on American soil, the defendant is an American
citizen, or the alleged conduct substantially and adversely affects an
American national interest, with a note that this last jurisdictionconferring situation includes a distinct national interest in the United
States not becoming a safe harbor for torturers or other common
enemies of mankind.323 To minimize international friction, Justice
Breyer would only interpret the statute to provide jurisdiction where
distinctly American interests were at issue.324 Jurisdiction would be
further restricted by other principles such as exhaustion, forum non
conveniens, and comity.325
Justice Breyer noted that the United States has a strong interest in not
becoming a safe harbor for pirates or their modern equivalent, and
proposed that the interest can justify extension of ATS jurisdiction.326
The ATS’ purpose was as a “weapon” against modern pirates. The duty
to not provide safe harbor to pirates was not only a well-established one
in international law,327 but one through which some modern courts have
conferred ATS jurisdiction itself.328 Interpreting this interest as one of
not providing safe harbor to violators would be consistent with
international law and practice.329 Permitting a suit by an alien against a
321. Specifically, Sosa urged caution to avoid international friction. See supra note 146 and
accompanying text (discussing Sosa’s exhortations to judicial caution).
322. As interpreted by Sosa, the purpose of the ATS is to compensate those injured by modern
pirates. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1673 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 1674.
324. Id.
325. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra Part I.D (outlining
potential procedural limitations on ATS, such as exhaustion and statutes of limitations).
326. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring). To do otherwise would be to “turn a
blind eye to the plight of victims [who have suffered] heinous actions.” Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
327. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674–75 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reciting list of international
and historical precedent). The duty to not provide safe harbor to pirates is a firmly-established
one, even within the United States. In Colonial times, harboring piracy was a serious charge,
despite the economic benefits and booty they brought to American ports; governors who harbored
pirates could expect to be the targets of royal inquiry. NORMAN K. RISJORD, REPRESENTATIVE
AMERICANS: THE COLONISTS 159–61 (2d ed. 2001).
328. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring); see In re Estate of Marcos, Human
Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (successful suit by alien plaintiff against alien
defendant for torts committed abroad); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(another successful suit by alien plaintiff against alien defendant for torts committed abroad); see
also Part I.C.1 supra (discussing Filartiga).
329. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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citizen would also not be controversial in practice, as other countries
grant jurisdiction for claims brought by aliens against their own citizens
for conduct abroad.330
Some countries also permit suits by aliens against aliens for torts
committed abroad, based on jurisdictional grants similar to those
outlined in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.331 Furthermore,
several countries that do not permit such suits themselves would not
object to other nations doing so.332 Domestically, Congress has ratified
several treaties that obligate the United States to punish perpetrators of
serious crimes committed abroad.333 Congress also passed the Torture

330. Id. at 1675–76. The international importance of Kiobel drew a number of amicus briefs
on behalf of foreign nations and intergovernmental organizations. Perhaps the strongest support
for this proposition comes from the amicus brief of the European Commission, the executive
body of the European Union, which calls the exercise of American jurisdiction over conduct
committed by its nationals abroad “uncontroversial.” Brief of the European Commission on
Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 11–12, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (asserting that
jurisdiction based on nationality is consistent with international law).
331. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (in limited circumstances, countries may
exercise jurisdiction for alien claims against aliens for actions abroad). There is furthermore a
large amount of scholarship favorably describing the international extension of civil liability for
major criminal acts. See, e.g., Kathryn Metcalf, Reparations for Displaced Torture Victims, 19
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 468–71 (2011) (describing the emergence of universal civil
jurisdiction as a tool to combat major violations of international law); Robert C. Thompson, Anita
Ramasastry & Mark B. Taylor, Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business
Entities Implicated in International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841, 885–86 (2009)
(claiming “many countries” have some sort of restitution mechanism, with explicit mechanisms in
place in Argentina, Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands, and Spain).
332. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, two countries that have not implemented
ATS-like jurisdictional grants, have nevertheless indicated that they would not object to
American exercise of such jurisdiction in cases similar to Filartiga. Brief of the Governments of
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15–16, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (holding that where a defendant is an alien,
presence of a “genuine connection” between defendant and United States is sufficient to support
jurisdiction).
333. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring). Because of the broad nature of the
term “law of nations,” there is a large body of potentially applicable treaties to any given ATS
claim. Nations have general obligations. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55 (obligating signatories to
promote, inter alia, social progress, international cooperation, and respect for human rights).
However, there are a number of highly specific treaties that criminalize certain conduct. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532
(codification of international principles regarding the protection of diplomats); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1870, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192
(commonly known as the Hague Hijacking Convention, providing for international
criminalization of hijacking).
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Victim Protection Act, intended to supplement and enhance remedies
under the ATS.334
Justice Breyer’s test would find jurisdiction where the tort occurred
on American soil, the defendant is a citizen, or the conduct substantially
and adversely affects a national interest. Applying this test to the facts
of Kiobel, Justice Breyer determined that jurisdiction would not be
proper.335 The conduct took place abroad, both parties were foreign,
and there was no distinctly American interest present in the case.336
The outcome—the dismissal of the case—might have been the same,
but Justice Breyer’s rationale was radically different.
III. ANALYSIS
This Part evaluates the standard articulated by the majority,
concluding that though it is spartan, it can be expanded to a workable
threshold test without too much extrapolation.337 Even so, it is difficult
to square the majority’s extraterritoriality analysis with the bulk of prior
Alien Tort Statute precedent. The alternative test proposed by Justice
Breyer338 has similar effects to the majority’s standard, but is presented
in a more formalistic manner, offering two bright line tests and a
flexible “American interests” component.339 The first two components

Some treaties go beyond criminalization, explicitly obligating signatories to punish offenders.
See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment arts. 5(2), 7(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (requiring signatories to establish
jurisdiction over offenders when present in their territory, or extradite such offender for
prosecution); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (requiring contracting parties to take any action
necessary to provide effective sanctions for violating the Convention, and obligating them to
search for alleged violators thereof).
334. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676–77 (Breyer, J., concurring); see TVPA §§ 2(a)–(c), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2012).
335. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring).
336. “[I]t would be farfetched to believe, based solely upon the defendants’ minimal and
indirect American presence, which this legal action helps to vindicate a distinct American
interest.” Id. at 1678. The fact that the defendant was corporate did not play into the analysis.
337. See infra Part III.A (discussing majority’s standard). Determining the limits of the
standard, on the other hand, is a different issue entirely. See infra Part IV.D.2 (noting that current
courts face difficulties in interpreting “touch and concern” language of the standard consistently).
338. The concurrences of Justices Kennedy and Alito will not be discussed, as neither offers a
full-fledged proposal in the alternative. Both Justices joined the opinion of the Court, and their
rationale does not significantly differ from that of the majority. See generally infra Parts II.C–D
(presenting the concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and Alito). In case law since Kiobel, the
substantial majority of the analysis of Kiobel focuses on either the majority’s holding or Justice
Breyer’s concurrence. See infra Part IV.D (discussing implementation of Kiobel).
339. See infra Part III.B (discussing elements of Justice Breyer’s proposed test).
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extend jurisdiction where it is not likely to be controversial, and the
third component functions as an explicit limiting principle to address the
foreign policy concerns that undergird the majority’s appeal to the
presumption against extraterritoriality.
A. The Majority’s Standard: Touch and Concern
The majority’s standard is fairly straightforward, requiring that ATS
claims “touch and concern the territory of the United States.”340 It does
not, however, offer much by way of guidance on its own application.
This problem is magnified because the Court’s holding runs counter to
the prior holdings of most courts that have previously addressed the
ATS’ extraterritoriality;341 courts attempting to apply the Kiobel
standard must do so without the benefit of precedent or experience.
1. Elements of the Standard
Under the majority’s standard, claims brought under the ATS must
establish jurisdiction by passing the threshold issue of extraterritorial
application.342 The standard as such is a fairly simple one: for conduct
taking place outside the United States to be actionable under the ATS, it
must “touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”343
This standard is refreshingly brief; of the majority’s thirty-one
paragraphs, the standard appears in exactly one of them.344 The
standard is a simple binary test: conduct either takes place outside of the
United States’ territory or it does not.345 If the conduct is foreign, then
it must touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to
displace the presumption;346 if it is domestic, then the claim is
permissible.347

340. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
341. Namely, that courts have generally assumed it does have extraterritorial application. See,
e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011) (reciting
unanimous circuit precedent holding the ATS to apply to extraterritorial actions).
342. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
343. Id. at 1669.
344. Id. at 1662–69.
345. The majority is careful to note that, on the Kiobel facts, all conduct took place outside the
United States. Id. at 1669 (finding that all relevant conduct took place outside the United States);
see infra Part III.A.2 (discussing potential issues with mixed-conduct cases which could arise if
some action took place domestically and some took place abroad).
346. Id. at 1669.
347. Passing the extraterritoriality bar by no means guarantees that the claim will ultimately
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The ultimate purpose motivating the standard is a cautionary one: the
presumption against extraterritoriality prevents domestic courts from
taking actions with significant foreign policy ramifications of the sort
best left to the other two branches of government.348 Not restricting
actions based on conduct on United States soil preserves the ATS’
original jurisdictional purpose in providing a method of redress for
foreign nationals349 and its historical use in punishing piracy.350
2. Difficulties in the Standard’s Application
The extreme brevity of the standard351 makes interpreting it more
difficult, due to the absence of context. The Court’s only guidance on
interpretation of its standard is that the mere corporate presence of a
defendant within the United States does not satisfy the standard.352
As Justice Kennedy notes,353 the standard’s brevity leaves several
significant questions unanswered. The majority may have intended
Congress to fill gaps in the ATS through legislation similar to the
Torture Victim Protection Act.354 In the meantime, and unlike most
Supreme Court issues involving statutory interpretation, there is little
be successful; it is simply a procedural threshold to be passed before addressing the merits of the
case, as with other requirements such as exhaustion. See supra Part I.D (detailing various
procedural requirements that apply to ATS claims).
348. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; see also supra note 278 and accompanying text (reciting
recent objections to extraterritorial applications of ATS). In this respect the Court follows its own
exhortations to judicial caution in Sosa. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (Sosa court’s
emphasis on judicial caution).
349. See supra Part I.A, notes 33–41 and accompanying text (discussing domestic assaults on
foreign ambassadors).
350. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing uses of ATS to provide jurisdiction for enforcement of
seizures occurring within US territorial waters).
351. The crucial sentence that sets out the standard is twenty-eight words long, shorter than
even the ATS itself. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern
the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”).
352. Id. The Court also refers to some choice language from the previous prominent ruling on
the subject of extraterritoriality. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)
(discussing that in the context of securities transactions, “the presumption against extraterritorial
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some
domestic activity is involved in the case”). Unfortunately, “some” activity is about as vague as
stating that corporate presence alone is not enough. Something more is required; indeed, “some”
thing more—but what that thing is remains unclear.
353. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
354. Though the majority does not mention the TVPA, Justice Kennedy does, noting that
torture cases are now dealt with through the TVPA’s statutory scheme. Id.; see also TVPA §
2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (establishing a mechanism for liability). The ATS is still available
for torture claims, but the torture-tailored provisions of the TVPA make it a more attractive
statute upon which to found jurisdiction.

MOE PRINT FINAL 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

268

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

10/4/2014 1:30 PM

[Vol. 46

case law on extraterritoriality in the ATS to guide courts, as no courts
had previously found extraterritorial application of the ATS
problematic.355
Though the extraterritorial application of the ATS may have been
objected to in some instances,356 there are other instances in which other
nations have not objected to such applications.357 Perhaps most
tellingly, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law explicitly allows a
state to extend jurisdiction beyond its territory.358 While these
precedents do not speak directly to the ATS,359 they seem to indicate
that exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction for recovery on violations of
the law of nations is permissible. Within American law, no other
statutes fit that description, save for the ATS.360 Seeking a “clear
indication” of statutory intent to rebut the presumption in the ATS361
might make sense for interpreting a modern statute, but the ATS dates
to 1789,362 far earlier than the modern presumption against
extraterritoriality.363 It makes no sense to seek a modern notion of
statutory indication in a statute enacted before that notion even

355. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011)
(surveying ATS jurisprudence and concluding that ATS had always been extraterritorially
applied). See generally supra Part I.E (discussing circuit precedent regarding extraterritoriality).
356. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (reciting recent objections to extraterritorial
applications of the ATS).
357. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring) (pointing out that United Kingdom and
the Netherlands would not object to exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases like Filartiga
and Marcos); see also supra text accompanying notes 331 (nations that allow ATS-like
jurisdiction to prosecute conduct that occurred abroad), 332 (nations that would not object to ATS
jurisdiction), and 333 (discussing treaties that obligate nations to prosecute certain types of
conduct, regardless of the location of the action).
358. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
359. And, conversely, the ATS does not speak to them. The majority reasons that there is
nothing in the ATS that explicitly rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality. Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. at 1665.
360. And, of course, the TVPA, which was explicitly passed to supplement the ATS, rather
than replace it. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the intent behind
supplementing the ATS).
361. As the majority does. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665 (seeking a “clear indication of
extraterritoriality”).
362. In its formal enactment in the Judiciary Act. Its roots date slightly father back. See
supra Part I.A (discussing origin of ATS in Articles of Confederation).
363. The specific term “presumption against extraterritoriality” is first found in E.E.O.C. v.
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). Though the notion is far older, there is
no evidence to indicate that the precedent was in force in 1789. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (recognizing that all legislation is prima facie
territorial); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 74 (1825) (claiming the Spanish law asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction is “inconsistent with the law of nature”).

MOE PRINT FINAL 3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

A Test By Any Other Name

10/4/2014 1:30 PM

269

existed.364
Lastly, there are several smaller procedural issues stemming from the
unclear limits of extraterritoriality. How much of the conduct must
occur on United States soil365 for it to be territorial? Within the United
States, actions366 taking place across multiple states may give multiple
states jurisdiction; the question would be one of venue for a suit, rather
than whether one may be properly brought at all, as would be the case
for any ATS claims.367 It remains an open question as to how such
“mixed-conduct” cases would be resolved if conduct only partially
occurred abroad.368
B. Justice Breyer’s Test: Three Paths to Jurisdiction
The test proposed by Justice Breyer is subdivided into three
components,369 each of which tends to be better-defined and bettersupported by international and domestic precedent than the majority’s
standard. While Justice Breyer’s proposed test is not perfect,370 it
provides a better framework with which to evaluate specific cases.371

364. It would have been impossible for Congress to know what the Supreme Court would
have been looking for, because the ATS was passed almost two years before the very first
Supreme Court case. See Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791) (first case
docketed at the Supreme Court; the Court issued a procedural order on August 1, 1791, but the
parties eventually settled before the Court could issue a merits ruling).
365. That is, within the bounds of United States territorial jurisdiction; this of course includes
territorial waters. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting that in Moxon v. The Fanny,
17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895), ATS jurisdiction was upheld for actions in territorial
waters).
366. Here, actions giving rise to civil suits. Criminal jurisdiction is broad, but as the ATS is
purely a civil statute, an analogy to criminal procedure would be of little value, though much of
the same problems can arise in criminal law. See generally David Keenan & Sabrina P. Shroff,
Taking the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Seriously in Criminal Cases after Morrison
and Kiobel, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2013) (discussing the effect of Kiobel’s extraterritoriality
jurisprudence on criminal law).
367. In the context of the ATS, there might not be another forum, or it might be unavailable as
a matter of practicality for the plaintiff. Requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies would limit
ATS cases such that, if a case did appear in the United States, it would be as a last resort, without
any alternative foreign forum. See supra Part I.D (discussing exhaustion within the context of the
ATS).
368. See, e.g., Roger L. Phillips, Piracy—Not just Kiobel’s Analogy, COMMUNIS HOSTIS
OMNIUM (Apr. 23, 2003), http://piracy-law.com/2013/04/23/piracy-not-just-kiobels-analogy/
(suggesting case-by-case analysis to determine where majority of conduct took place, and noting
that a direct answer to the mixed-conduct question would elucidate the “touch and concern” test).
369. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring); see infra Part III.B.1 (discussing components of the test).
370. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing difficulties with Justice Breyer’s test).
371. See infra Part IV.D (discussing current implementation of Kiobel standards).
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1. Three Components of the Proposed Test
Rejecting the presumption against extraterritoriality as validly
applying to the ATS,372 Justice Breyer offers a parallel test; a test that
is, if nothing else, more clearly articulated than the standard set up by
the majority.373 Justice Breyer would find ATS jurisdiction where at
least one of three elements is present: the tort occurred on United States
soil, the defendant is an American citizen, or the action substantially
and adversely affects an important national interest.374 Finding
jurisdiction where the tort occurred on United States territory is not
controversial, and in this respect Justice Breyer’s test parallels both the
test of the majority375 and precedent.376
The test diverges from the majority’s standard by categorically
upholding jurisdiction where the defendant is a United States national.
While it is possible that having a United States citizen as a defendant
will always touch and concern the United States sufficiently to displace
the presumption, the majority’s standard does not foreclose on the
possibility that it will not.377 When the Court dismissed the Kiobel
claims, however, it noted that corporate presence alone did not support
ATS jurisdiction,378 implying that some form of corporate presence
could support a claim for conduct occurring abroad.379
This extension of liability would track other areas of United States
law, in which legal action against United States citizens for actions that
took place abroad is unquestionably permissible.380 The United States
372. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1672–73 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying
notes 302–320 (discussing Justice Breyer’s rejection of the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
373. Compare supra text accompanying notes 345–347 (expanding majority opinion’s
standard into a threshold test), with Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (setting out
a proposed alternate test for jurisdiction under the ATS).
374. Id.
375. The presumption against extraterritoriality can only apply to actions taking place
extraterritorially; that domestic activity passes the majority’s extraterritoriality standard is trivial.
376. See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing original use of ATS to provide jurisdiction for seizures
in United States territorial waters).
377. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (holding that claims must touch and concern United
States, without reference to nationality of defendant).
378. Id.
379. For more on corporate presence, see infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing interpretations of
corporate presence in the aftermath of Kiobel).
380. To assert otherwise would imply that all United States citizens have diplomatic
immunity. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 333, art. 1 (defining “internationally
protected person” as a limited class consisting of a head of state, official representative of a state,
or a family member thereof).
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already exercises foreign jurisdiction regarding its nationals, such as
jury duty381 and taxation.382 Imposing legal requirements on a state’s
own nationals abroad is a recognized and accepted state action.383 To
additionally extend liability to American citizens for egregious
violations of international law would not be unprecedented; it could be
treated as a civil variation of criminal extradition.384 Such extension of
liability would, if nothing else, ease international tensions by allowing
aliens to recover against American nationals.385
The third circumstance Justice Breyer offered under which ATS
jurisdiction would be permitted is where foreign conduct substantially
and adversely affects an important American national interest.386
Crucially, Justice Breyer recognizes that this would permit recovery
against aliens, so long as the conduct complained of adversely affects an
important national interest. Such an interpretation would be in line with
legislation in place in other countries,387 as well as the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law.388
Justice Breyer also explicitly notes that preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor for common enemies of humankind is one

381. Federal juror eligibility includes a one-year residency requirement. 28 U.S.C. §
1865(b)(1) (2012). State requirements vary, and do not always require strict residency. See, e.g.,
People v. Williams, 827 P.2d 612 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (retaining juror as qualified where juror
spent voted and paid taxes in another district, but spent more than 50% of his time in the relevant
district). In either case, so long as the individual’s residence remains within a domestic district,
he or she may be obligated to jury service, regardless of the person’s physical location.
382. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 901 (2012) (providing statutory basis for foreign income
taxation exclusion to prevent situations where double taxation might occur); Jill Meyer,
Comment, 2006 Amendments to the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion: Effects, Reactions, and
Suggestions for Change, 60 SMU L. REV. 1667 (2007) (overview of the United States’ foreign
income taxation regime).
383. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987)
(permitting a state to proscribe law with respect to its nationals inside and outside of its territory).
384. Such extension of jurisdiction over nationals’ actions abroad is already practiced by other
nations. See supra note 331 and accompanying text (discussing other nations which permit civil
jurisdiction over their citizens for actions committed abroad).
385. On this point, the effects of Justice Breyer’s test run exactly counter to the majority’s
concern that allowing recovery against aliens is a violation of a foreign state’s sovereignty. See
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013) (majority finds
punishing piracy acceptable as it does not impose one state’s sovereign will on other states).
386. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
387. Id. at 1676 (noting that some countries that have adopted universal criminal jurisdiction
for crimes such as genocide also permit civil actions by aliens against aliens for conduct abroad).
388. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (permitting
states to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction for certain offenses recognized as such by the
community of nations).
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such distinct and important interest.389 Formally sanctioning such an
interest would clearly enact the provisions of the Restatement,390 and
would follow in a line of precedent that indicates that not harboring
pirates, or their modern equivalent, is an important state and
international interest.391
Lastly, requiring distinctly American interests to be at issue in
otherwise purely foreign cases serves as an ultimate limiting principle,
curtailing ATS jurisdiction only to those situations where it is
reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdiction.392 Under these
limiting principles, the ATS would furthermore be limited by other
principles such as exhaustion, comity, and forum non conveniens,
ensuring that claims are only adjudicated in American courts when there
is no other suitable forum, and limiting claims where another state can
adequately redress the harm.393
2. Difficulties in Applying the Test
Justice Breyer’s proposed test is not without its difficulties. Perhaps
most notably, because—like the majority’s standard—Justice Breyer’s
is also a new test, it suffers from much the same issues of definition.394
Though both the majority opinion and Justice Breyer offer relatively
ambiguous tests—”touch and concern”395 and, inter alia, “important
American national interest”396 respectively—Justice Breyer’s test would
require less definition in subsequent cases. This is both because there
already exists a large body of case law that supports limited

389. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (preventing United States from being a
safe harbor to enemies of mankind is an important national interest).
390. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (recognizing limited permissibility of
universal criminal jurisdiction).
391. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674–75 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reciting precedent on the issue of
harboring pirates); see, e.g., RISJORD, supra note 327 (not harboring pirates was an important
interest in the Colonies).
392. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct., at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). This mirrors the “reasonability”
provision of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403
(stating that, generally, states may not exercise international jurisdiction where such would be
unreasonable).
393. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that other factors may restrict
the ATS’ scope); see also supra Part I.D (discussing procedural elements that may limit the
application of the ATS).
394. In this respect, any new test will necessarily require further definition. The benefit of
Justice Breyer’s test over the majority’s standard lies in how much further definition is required,
and the magnitude of harm in possible misinterpretation of the standard.
395. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
396. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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extraterritorial application of the ATS,397 and because explicitly
granting ATS jurisdiction over acts that take place within the United
States, or with American nationals as defendants,398 limits the scope of
jurisdictional review.
Crucially, although the majority’s standard looks to the location of
the conduct, leading to difficulties in determining jurisdiction with cases
occurring in more than one location,399 Justice Breyer’s proposed test
looks to the effects of the action. This permits courts to be more
flexible in their analyses and provides a better framework with which to
analyze human rights violations.
IV. CURRENT AND FUTURE IMPACT
As Alien Tort Statute litigation has become more frequent and
significant, the need for clear standards has only become more
pressing.400 Current applications of Kiobel differ significantly on
matters of identification and interpretation of the majority’s standard.401
Justice Breyer’s test can be reconciled within the standard of the
majority, diverging only where Justice Breyer’s interpretation is borne
out by legislative and judicial precedent.402 Applying his proposed test
as a way to meet the majority’s standard provides crucial guidance and
gives courts a framework with which to approach ATS cases.403
A. The Increasing Importance of ATS Litigation
Since Filartiga, ATS litigation has become much more frequent.404

397. See supra Parts I.C–E (outlining modern developments of ATS case law, generally
accepting of extraterritorial application); see also Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643
F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011) (review of extraterritoriality precedent).
398. That is, the first two prongs of Justice Breyer’s test, which are fairly straightforward
bright line tests. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
399. See supra note 368 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties with determining
mixed-conduct cases where the conduct alleged occurs both abroad and on U.S. soil).
400. Young, supra note 182, at 74–81 (analyzing ATS as the “centerpiece” for transnational
public law litigation and as one component of a broader structural debate over private
enforcement of international law).
401. See infra Part IV.B (discussing various interpretations of Kiobel).
402. See infra Part IV.C.3 (reconciling the test proposed by Justice Breyer as a method of
meeting the majority’s broader standard).
403. See infra Part IV.D (discussing current courts’ implementation of Kiobel and manners in
which courts have attempted to meet the majority’s standard by reference to the specific
requirements of Justice Breyer’s test).
404. See, e.g., Hufbauer, supra note 118, at 610 (Filartiga paved the way for expansions of
ATS’ scope); Young, supra note 182, at 74–81 (ATS as “centerpiece” of transnational public law
litigation).
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Human rights considerations have played a pivotal role in increasing
litigation,405 but pecuniary interests cannot be discounted, as successful
ATS claims can be both highly lucrative and highly damaging.406
Though the ATS as originally enacted407 refers only to violations of
treaties or the law of nations,408 the Second Circuit in Filartiga
interpreted it to support violations of international human rights law.409
The new interpretation of the ATS provided victims of human rights
violations with a rare tool with which to seek redress.410 In 1992,
Congress advanced these developments by enacting the Torture Victim
Protection Act, which provided explicit relief for victims of foreign
torture, a relief mechanism that is both concurrent with and broader than
the ATS.411 The ATS has developed into the center of gravity for
contemporary foreign human rights litigation,412 sanctioned by
Congress,413 and generally approved of by most executive
administrations since Filartiga.414
Victims of human rights abuses generally have little recourse against
405. See generally Mirela V. Hristova, The Alien Tort Statute: A Vehicle for Implementing the
United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and Promoting Corporate
Social Responsibility, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 89 (2012) (viewing imposition of liability on non-state
actors as method induce conformity to human rights principles).
406. A successful award is its own reward, but human rights organizations might desire a
wider chilling effect on a certain class of activity in general. Given the potential magnitude of
ATS litigation, such a broader result is entirely feasible. See, e.g., Hufbauer & Mitrokostas,
supra note 118, at 617–18 (discussing chilling effect of potential billion-dollar ATS awards on
international trade).
407. Subject to subsequent non-substantive changes in wording. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text (discussing the minor textual changes to the ATS between its passage and its
current wording).
408. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
409. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
410. Pierre N. Leval, The Long Arm of International Law: Giving Victims of Human Rights
Abuses Their Day in Court, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 16.
411. TVPA §§ 2(a)–(c), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see, e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d
877 (7th Cir. 2005) (barring ATS claims but allowing suit to proceed under TVPA); id. at 876–77
(discussing how TVPA was intended to expand, not contract, ATS remedies).
412. See Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 601 (2013) (concluding ATS has provided a focal
point for modern human rights litigation).
413. This was accomplished by passing the TVPA.
414. David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and its Discontents, 2 CHI J. INT’L L.
475, 477 (2001) (every executive administration since Filartiga has approved of the ATS as a
remedy for human rights abuses). The administration of President Bush, Jr. expressed support for
the ATS’ goals, but moved to block ATS litigation largely in circumstances surrounding
corporate liability, a move some commentators have decried as political intervention to protect
private interests. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: the Bush Administration’s
Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 169–79 (2004).
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their abusers: suits brought in foreign countries may be fruitless, as
foreign judiciaries may be subject to the control of those perpetrating
the abuses415—if such suits are even permissible at all, due to sovereign
immunity.416 Successfully-brought human rights cases can serve as
vehicles to draw attention to atrocities and deter future abusers.417 They
can also provide some measure of solace to the victims418 and can
potentially provide considerable recovery through damages.419
Adverse financial awards are undesirable to potential defendants, and
unchecked ATS litigation creates a further risk of causing an extensive
depressive effect on international trade.420 If a low enough barrier to
ATS ligation opens multinational enterprises to liability for conducting
business in certain countries, then they are much less likely to do so,
curtailing trade and cutting financial ties.421 Though the proliferation of

415. If a foreign state is sanctioning gross human rights abuses of the sort that rise to the level
of ATS violations, it would unfortunately not be surprising for that same state to suppress or
otherwise manipulate the rule of law within its borders to serve its ends. See, e.g., Bowoto v.
Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding Nigerian judiciary subject
to pressure from executive and legislative branches as well as corruption and inefficiency,
justifying waiver of any exhaustion requirement).
416. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§1602–11 (2012)
(establishing grounds on which a foreign sovereign may or may not be liable for suit). In
appropriate circumstances, the FSIA has barred claims brought under the ATS. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (FSIA bars claims
against a foreign state unless an exception applies). But see Douglas M. Evans, Comment,
Sovereign Immunity—Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act—Jurisdiction Granted Under Alien Tort
Statute; Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), 12
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. J. 687 (1989) (analyzing properly-stated claims under ATS as a
categorical exception to FSIA).
417. See Leval, supra note 410 (successful ATS litigation calls attention to human rights
violations and deters abuses).
418. See id. (successful ATS litigation provides some comfort to plaintiffs).
419. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 866–67 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (on remand
from Second Circuit, analyzing previous awards of punitive damages and awarding a total
judgment of $10,385,364 in costs and punitive damages to deter practice of torture); Hufbauer &
Mitrokostas, supra note 118, at 607 (envisioning an ATS complaint in the total amount of $26
billion being settled for $10 billion). Whether such awards could be collected or not is a different
issue; some foreign parties might well be judgment-proof. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (civil suit against Osama Bin Laden and al-Quaeda).
420. See generally Hufbauer, supra note 118 (examining risk of expansion of ATS litigation
in the wake of Sosa, including dampening effects on trade, investment, and extensions of credit);
Stephens, supra note 414, at 178–89 (summarizing “corporate opposition” to ATS).
421. Gary C. Hufbauer & Barbara Oegg, Economic Sanctions: Public Goals and Private
Compensation, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 305, 326–27 (2003) (discussing chilling effect of ATS litigation
on foreign investment); see, e.g., Brief for the National Foreign Trade Council, USA*Engage,
The National Association of Manufacturers, The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, and the United States Council for International Business as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 1, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003) (No. 03-339), 2003 WL
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such suits has not spiraled out of control—as some have feared422—the
magnitude of the potential risks involved reaffirms the Sosa Court’s
exhortations to judicial caution in this arena.423
B. A Pressing Need for Clear Standards
While all newly-articulated judicial tests require some amount of
interpretation to be consistently applied, the need for clear standards in
ATS jurisprudence is especially strong. Several lower courts applying
the Kiobel rule have fatally misinterpreted it, and while the rule has
proven useful in some instances to bar some frivolous claims,424
misinterpretation is not ideal. Even if correctly interpreted, however,
the exact nature of the majority’s standard is unclear: it refers to two
terms of art, neither of which is given sufficient explanation or
contextual meaning to allow for consistent application.
1. Proper Application of the Court’s Current
Standard is Unclear
Though all new rules and interpretations will, by virtue of their
novelty, require some amount of judicial interpretation, the brevity of
the majority’s standard provides little guidance.425 The Court simply
notes that corporate presence alone is not sufficient to displace the
presumption.426 With no body of case law upon which to draw,427
lower courts are forced to address ATS issues as matters of first
impression. Without so much as a hint at what the Court intended by its
standard, lower courts have come out in different ways on the matter.
In the six months following Kiobel, the case was applied by district

22429204 (alleging that suits against corporate defendants seek to punish companies for investing
in rights-abusive governments).
422. See, e.g., Brief for the National Foreign Trade Council et al., supra note 421, at 4–5
(describing ATS suits as “serious impediments” to foreign investment); Hufbauer, supra note
118, at 614–15 (predicting risks of ATS litigation expanding into a plaintiff’s market).
423. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (Sosa court’s repeated urges to judicial
caution in ATS claims).
424. See infra note 432 and accompanying text (discussing frivolous claims barred by
applying the Kiobel standard).
425. That is, one relatively short paragraph. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
—, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); see supra note 351 and accompanying text (discussing length
of actual standard).
426. Id.; see also infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing interpretations of the majority standard).
427. As the majority’s standard effectively reverses a thirty-two-year-old assumption that
extraterritoriality is permissible, there is very little case law to flesh out the majority’s standard.
See supra Part I.E (discussing history of extraterritoriality in ATS jurisprudence, noting that most
courts until Kiobel found extraterritorial application of the ATS permissible).
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courts from Oregon428 to Florida,429 and twice on appeal.430 Crucially,
some district courts’ applications of the Kiobel holding appear to be
improper: several district courts have denied ATS claims, citing Kiobel
for the proposition that extraterritorial application of the ATS is flatly
impermissible, without reference to the crucial “touch and concern”
language that was the primary rule of the holding.431 While dismissing
the “touch and concern” standard may provide a simpler tool with
which to rule on potentially frivolous cases,432 the motivation for the
Court’s order for rehearing and eventually ruling on extraterritoriality
was to specify which extraterritorial claims could be permitted.433
2. There is Little to Guide the Standard’s Application
In Sosa, the Court asserted that not all violations of the law of nations
would be actionable, and set up a standard to determine which

428. Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1415-TC, 2013 WL 3006338, at *7 (D. Or.
June 11, 2013) (under Kiobel, presumption of extraterritoriality bars claims based on foreign
action).
429. Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Al-Assad, No. 1:13-cv-48-RV-GRJ, 2013 WL 4401831, at *2
(N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013) (concluding the 2011 Syrian civil war does not touch or concern United
States).
430. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing ATS claims); Bauman
v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. DaimlerChrysler
AG v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (remanding ATS claims in light of Kiobel).
431. See, e.g., United States v. Viertel, Nos. 08 Civ. 7512(JGK), 01 Cr. 0571(JGK), 2013 WL
5526242, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2013) (in analogy to Kiobel, asserting that Kiobel simply held
that extraterritorial conduct is not grounds for ATS liability); Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Inc., No.
2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873965, at *3 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013) (finding that claims
based on extraterritorial conduct simply “fail” as directed under Kiobel, without mention of
“touch and concern”); Mwangi v. Bush, No. 5: 12-373-KKC, 2013 WL 3155018, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
June 18, 2013) (holding that, under Kiobel, ATS does not authorize jurisdiction over claims with
foreign conduct); Fotso, 2013 WL 3006338 at *7 (barring claims as presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to ATS, without mention of “touch and concern”).
432. It is solely a court’s prerogative to rule on the merits of claims. But see Ahmed-AlKhalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 3:13cv289-WS, 2013 WL 2432947 (N.D. Fla. June 3, 2013)
(plaintiff requested and was denied humanitarian aid by the Salvation Army in Nigeria; dismissed
for failure to touch and concern United States); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Queen Elizabeth II, No.
5:13-cv-103-RS-CJK, 2013 WL 2242459 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2013) (asserting plaintiff is a
descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, whose descendants fled Mecca to South Africa, claiming
damages for their suffering during Apartheid; dismissed for failure to touch and concern United
States, with judge noting that plaintiff seems to be forum-shopping for his frivolous complaints to
go forward).
433. The Court did not even explicitly state that extraterritorial claims would be
presumptively barred; that conclusion arises by implication. The Court’s language is solely in the
positive, describing the very exception itself: “even where the claims touch and concern the
territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption.”
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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violations permitted legal action.434 In Kiobel, the Court extended this
approach, holding that extraterritorial applications were presumptively
inapplicable and setting up a standard to determine what would
overcome that presumption. Unfortunately, the standard was presented
with little guidance to assist in determining just what constitutes action
that “touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the United States.”435
Within the context of the Court’s opinion, all nine Justices agreed
that “corporate presence” does not suffice,436 but the analysis ended
there, as the Court’s use of “corporate presence” was otherwise
unqualified.437 In conventional American jurisprudence, the term arises
most frequently in personal jurisdiction, where a corporation’s presence
in a state subjects it to liability for suit.438 By analogy to the
conventional use of the term, a corporation headquartered or
incorporated within the United States would have sufficient corporate
presence to satisfy the majority’s test.439 This appears to run contrary to
the Court’s intent in introducing a new limitation: if a corporation is
sufficiently present to satisfy the “touch and concern” requirement, the
corporation would remain a valid target for ATS litigation, even on the
basis of action that occurred purely abroad.440
The nature of “touch and concern” is even vaguer. While the term is
somewhat familiar in American jurisprudence, it comes from the realm
of property law. Since the sixteenth century, real covenants and
equitable servitude must “touch and concern” real property to run with
the land.441 Precedent here, however, is fruitless; in Kiobel, “touch and
434. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004).
435. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
436. Id. The corporate presence of the defendants in Kiobel comprised an office in New York
City, operated by a separate but affiliated company, along with shares bought and sold on the
New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring) (claiming corporate presence
is insufficient to satisfy the majority’s standard); see also id. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(finding corporate presence is insufficient under Justice Breyer’s alternative test).
437. See id. at 1669 (discussing insufficiency of defendant’s corporate presence, without
further qualification as to the nature of such presence).
438. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
439. Though the extent of activity within a state necessary to satisfy “corporate presence” has
been subject to debate in the half-century since International Shoe, the Court’s latest
interpretation has adopted a “nerve center” test. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 78 (2010).
440. See Kristin Linsley Myles, Kiobel commentary: Answers . . . and more questions,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentarykiobel-answers-and-more-questions/ (discussing various concerns with corporate defendants in
light of the Kiobel ruling on extraterritoriality).
441. “Touch and concern” in this context predates the United States by several centuries.
Spencer’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 72 (K.B. 1582) (in order to run with land, covenants must touch
and concern real property). See generally A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern Is Dead, Long
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concern” is functionally a new term of art, one which is likely to be
interpreted only through future litigation.442
C. Reconciliation of Majority Standard with
Justice Breyer’s Test
In Filartiga, the Second Circuit opened the doors to ATS litigation,
but in Sosa, the Supreme Court closed them slightly, explicitly
establishing a set of standards with which to assess ATS claims.443
While the Court in Kiobel unanimously intended to further restrict the
scope of permissible litigation,444 there was a significant split as to how
to do so. By interpreting the standard of the majority with Justice
Breyer’s three-part test, it is possible to provide additional guidance on
the Court’s meaning while remaining within the suggested practical
limitations on ATS jurisdiction.
The majority applies extraterritoriality jurisprudence to the ATS,
concluding that it is subject to the normal presumption against
extraterritorial application of statutes.445 The presumption, however, is
just that: an inference that can be overcome with other evidence.446
Though Justice Breyer’s alternative test is explicitly constructed without
reference to the presumption of extraterritoriality,447 the three-part test
he presents can be conceptualized as a way in which a claim might be
understood to touch and concern the territory of the United States, as
required by the majority.448

Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. REV. 804 (1998) (discussing modern developments in the touch and
concern doctrine within the context of real property).
442. “[T]oday, the Supreme Court has provided fodder for another decade or more of
litigation . . . [as] advocates will battle over when claims touch and concern the U.S. with
sufficient force.” Katie Redford, Commentary: Door still open for human rights claims after
Kiobel, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/
commentary-door-still-open-for-human-rights-claims-after-kiobel/ (discussing Kiobel’s effect on
ATS litigation). The value of scholarly analysis of these issues is as of yet unclear. Certainly
judicial authority, especially of the binding type, tends to be more persuasive.
443. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–32 (2004) (“We must still, however, derive
a standard or set of standards for assessing the particular claim Alvarez raises . . . .”).
444. The ruling was unanimous against allowing an ATS claim to proceed. Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concurred in the Court’s judgment, but not its opinion. See
Young, supra note 182, at 25–26 (stating that, contrary to expectations, Kiobel was unanimous
against permitting second-wave ATS litigation).
445. “[T]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and . . .
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
—, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
446. See Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
447. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671, 1672–73 (Breyer, J., concurring).
448. Id. at 1669.
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Cases satisfying the first two points can be categorically determined
to meet the majority’s touch and concern standard. While Justice
Breyer’s third point would extend jurisdiction farther than the
majority’s standard would, such extension is in line with legal and
legislative precedent as well as the United States’ stated foreign policy.
In this manner, Justice Breyer’s test largely shadows the majority’s
standard, providing jurisdiction wherever the majority would, and
extending jurisdiction over a relatively limited set of cases in a manner
consistent with policy and precedent.
1. Torts Occurring on American Soil
The first of Justice Breyer’s elements would support jurisdiction
where the alleged tort occurs on American soil.449 That a tort taking
place on American soil touches and concerns the territory of the United
States is not controversial,450 as such an action would touch the United
States’ territory in a very literal sense of the term. Furthermore, any
action that takes place in United States territory would also concern the
United States; what more proper object of legal concern is there for a
state than torts taking place within its sovereign territory?
This understanding is in line with the original intent and application
of the ATS.451 The statute was created after a pair of high-profile
assaults against ambassadors provided a source of embarrassment for
the newly formed nation: torts committed by aliens against aliens within
United States territory.452 The ATS was created immediately after the
adoption of the Constitution, in order to enact a constitutional clause
that specifically authorized such jurisdiction.453
The first—and, for more than a hundred years, only—applications of
the ATS occurred under such a theory of jurisdiction, addressing acts
that occurred within the territorial waters of the United States.454 In this
respect, finding that torts occurring within American territory

449. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
450. See supra text accompanying notes 375–376 (discussing relatively uncontroversial nature
of allowing recovery for actions occurring within a court’s jurisdiction).
451. See generally supra Parts I.A–B (providing and discussing historical context surrounding
both the passage of the ATS and applications of the ATS in the eighteenth century).
452. See supra text accompanying notes 34–41(discussing two eighteenth-century attacks on
foreign officials).
453. See supra text accompanying notes 42–50 (enactment of ATS pursuant to Offenses
Clause). See generally Kontorovich, supra note 37 (discussing the Offenses Clause).
454. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895). Strictly speaking, M’Grath was an enforcement action, and
did not directly apply the ATS. See generally supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Moxon and Bolchos).
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sufficiently touch and concern the United States to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality is little more than a reaffirmation
of the oldest use and original purpose of the ATS.
2. Claims Brought Against American Nationals
The second prong of Justice Breyer’s test would support jurisdiction
where the defendant is an American citizen.455 Reconciling this
element with the majority’s standard is possible under the assertion that
all claims against American citizens necessarily touch and concern the
United States’ territory.456 This is a point of divergence with the
majority’s standard: while a claim against an American citizen for
conduct occurring abroad will likely touch and concern the United
States, the majority’s standard does not foreclose on the possibility that
it will not.
In affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims in Kiobel, however,
the Court noted that the defendants’ corporate presence did not support
jurisdiction under a touch and concern theory.457 That determination
seems to imply that some other form of corporate presence would
sufficiently touch and concern the United States, even though the
conduct occurred abroad.458 In the few cases on point decided since
Kiobel, district courts have ruled both ways on the matter.459
Permitting ATS suits against United States nationals because of their
citizenship would be in line with other areas of the law. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law explicitly permits a state to
exercise such jurisdiction.460 Indeed, the United States already extends
jurisdiction over its citizens for certain activities abroad.461 American

455. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
456. As provided for by the majority’s standard, which requires claims to touch and concern
American territory with enough strength to displace the presumption. See id. at 1669 (majority
standard); supra Part II.B (discussing majority standard).
457. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 380–385 (noting that Kiobel leaves open the
possibility that corporate presence may touch and concern the United States).
459. See infra note 480 and accompanying text (discussing cases that address corporate
presence since Kiobel). Compare Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL
4511354, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013) (finding American citizenship does not provide
sufficient grounds to support an ATS claim), with Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.
Supp. 2d 304, 310–11 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding that presumption of extraterritoriality does not
apply to ATS where defendant is American national).
460. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987).
461. Obligations of citizenship, regardless of the citizen’s physical location or domicile,
include paying taxes, see supra note 382 and accompanying text, and can include jury duty
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citizens are already held criminally liable for actions abroad.462
Extending civil liability for conduct that is not only criminal but also
sufficient to violate the law of nations is not only a logical extension of
current jurisprudence, but, in holding United States citizens to such
international standards,463 would also reaffirm American support of
those standards.464
3. Claims that Substantially and Adversely Affect
a Distinct National Interest
The third prong of Justice Breyer’s test is the broadest, and would
sustain liability where conduct abroad substantially and adversely
affects an important American national interest.465 Both this standard
and the majority’s standard are vague, lacking case law, legal or policy
precedent, or much of any other context to assist in definition.466
Whereas the first two elements of conduct performed either on United
States soil or by a United States national could be categorically defined
as adversely affecting an important American national interest, this third
element cannot.
There exist three possible permutations of the majority’s standard and
Justice Breyer’s third element.467 If both standards would grant or deny

service, see supra note 381 and accompanying text.
462. Criminal conduct abroad may be grounds for extradition: even if the conduct is not
prosecuted within the United States, there still exists jurisdiction to ensure that the accused party
is brought before a tribunal to answer for the allegations against him or her. Criminal extradition
is required in some circumstances. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (when contracting
state finds an alleged violator of the Geneva Convention, it must either try the defendant or
extradite him or her for trial elsewhere).
463. Standards that, while not exhaustively defined, historically included offenses against
ambassadors, violations of guarantees of safe conduct, and piracy. See supra note 81 and
accompanying text. They also include torture, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir.
1980), extrajudicial killings, sundry war crimes, and slavery. See supra text accompanying notes
204–212 (defining offenses that some courts have found to be violations of the law of nations).
464. Unquestionably, this interpretation would explicitly place liability on American citizens,
wherever they might be found. The additional burden, however, simply requires Americans to
not commit crimes abroad that are so egregious as to rise to the level of violations of international
law under Sosa. All of the potential grounds for ATS liability are already criminalized
domestically, otherwise they would not be internationally recognized. Requiring Americans to
not commit genocide is not a particularly onerous obligation, and would not be a new one.
465. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
466. Compare supra Part III.A.2 (discussing difficulties with standard of the majority), with
supra Part III.B.2 (discussing those same issues in the context of Justice Breyer’s standard).
467. This requires the assumptions that both the standard and test are binary propositions.
This seems to be borne out by the language used, as both the majority and Justice Breyer refer to
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jurisdiction, then the standards are interchangeable.468 If the tests
disagree on whether to grant jurisdiction,469 one of two cases has
occurred: either an action that touches and concerns the territory of the
United States does not adversely affect an important American national
interest, or an action affecting an important national interest does not
touch and concern American territory.470
The first of these two cases is easily disposed of: it is highly unlikely
that an action that touches United States territory does not adversely
affect an important national interest. It is therefore reasonable to assert
that the United States would have an important national interest in any
action that touched or concerned American territory.471
The second of the two permutations is more difficult. Justice
Breyer’s test would extend jurisdiction to, among others, any case that
involves an important American national interest, but does not
necessarily touch and concern the United States. In this respect, this test
is more permissive, extending jurisdiction farther afield, but it is not an
unreasonable extension. The majority’s standard, applied on its face,
meeting a standard. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (majority standard); see also id. at 1677–78
(Breyer, J., concurring). Furthermore, jurisdiction by nature is a Boolean proposition: either a
court has it, or it does not. Given two binary propositions, there can only exist four possible
conjunctions of their state. See generally WARREN GOLDFARB, DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 19–21 (2003)
(discussing the truth function of conjunction). Because it is unlikely that an action that meets the
majority’s touch and concern standard does not meet Justice Breyer’s test, there are functionally
three scenarios. See infra note 471 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of such a
potential case).
468. Though of course the rhetoric used to argue both tests would likely differ, if one were
treated as a logically equivalent interpretation of the other, satisfying one would satisfy the other.
Such a determination could only be made ex post facto; parties would need to know beforehand
what the relevant standard is, a determination this Note seeks to make.
469. As was the case in Kiobel, where both the majority and Justice Breyer found jurisdiction
improper. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring).
470. It should be noted that because Justice Breyer’s three-point test is disjunctive, rather than
conjunctive, only one of the three elements must be satisfied in order for ATS jurisdiction to hold.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). Claims arising “under” the third test for the
purposes of this analysis are therefore ones that cannot be sustained under the first two tests of
either involving American soil or an American defendant; these are therefore so-called “foreign
squared” cases involving an alien suing an alien for actions on alien soil. See, e.g., Oona
Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign squared” cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobelcommentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (discussing the nature of “foreign
squared” cases).
471. Any action brought under the ATS would allege a violation of the law of nations. Such
violations are typified by being extremely serious: after all, they are violations so unanimously
decried as to be accepted by the world at large—genocide, war crimes, and so forth. It is difficult
to imagine any such act that would touch American territory yet not be one in which the United
States had an important interest.
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would have rejected the claims in Filartiga;472 an alien torturing another
alien abroad does not palpably touch or concern the United States, and
so jurisdiction would not have been found. Under Justice Breyer’s test,
however, the distinct and well-established interest in not providing a
safe harbor to common enemies of mankind—here, a torturer—would
sustain jurisdiction over a torturer.473
While the majority’s test appeals to the presumption against
extraterritoriality to prevent courts from making foreign policy
decisions,474 this foreign policy decision has already been made:
Congress explicitly authorized recovery on facts such as Filartiga’s by
passing the TVPA.475 The government has already indicated that
extending jurisdiction in similar cases is not only permissible but
encouraged; allowing such actions fits into foreign relations interests of
the United States—interests such as the promotion of human rights,
which the TVPA was enacted to promote.476
Using Justice Breyer’s “distinct national interest” element as
satisfactory of the majority’s “touch and concern” standard would
extend jurisdiction farther than the touch and concern standard alone
would extend it, but such an extension would be both well within the
bounds of case law and the stated foreign policy interests of the United
States. Courts could approach any novel fact pattern arising under this
test through application of the “distinct American interests” test, much
like they would now have to apply the “touch and concern” test. There
may be unanswered questions lurking in a “distinct American interests”
test, but those questions would still be unanswered under the majority’s
“touch and concern” test.
D. Courts’ Current Implementation of Kiobel
With little guidance on the proper interpretation of the Court’s

472. See generally Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
473. See id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that important American national interests
include that of not providing safe harbor to pirates or common enemies of mankind).
474. See id. at 1664–65 (finding the danger of unwarranted judicial interference that underlies
presumption against extraterritoriality magnified in context of ATS; courts should recognize
foreign implications and act cautiously).
475. TVPA § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
476. “[A]llowing suits based on conduct occurring in a foreign country in the circumstances
presented in Filartiga is consistent with the foreign relations interests of the United States,
including the promotion of respect for human rights.” Supplemental Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 4–5, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569
U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 2161290 (in brief for the United States
government, discussing official governmental stance on ATS suits).
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standard, lower courts have been interpreting Kiobel in essentially an ad
hoc manner, a process that has led to interpretations so divergent that
they likely constitute errors of law.477 Though few courts have
addressed the case’s concurrences, at least one478 has used the test
offered by Justice Breyer as a mechanism for understanding and
evaluating claims under the majority’s standard.479
1. Courts Improperly Applying Kiobel to
Categorically Bar ATS Claims
Most lower courts relying on Kiobel have dismissed the claims before
them for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.480 While some have
properly applied the majority’s standard, determining that the claims do
not sufficiently touch and concern the United States,481 other courts
have read the ATS as barring all claims based on extraterritorial
actions.482 Although correcting such relatively simple errors of law is a
task suited for the circuit courts, the fact that such clear errors arise at
all is troubling.483

477. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 482, 491 (courts holding all extraterritorial
claims to be categorically barred, despite the Kiobel exception for claims that sufficiently touch
and concern the United States).
478. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013) (relying on Justice Breyer’s
rhetoric in discussion of the majority’s standard).
479. See infra Part IV.D.3 (discussing applications of Justice Breyer’s standard).
480. As of September 2014, Kiobel had been cited by 114 cases, including 86 district court
orders, 25 circuit court holdings, and a single remand by the Court for further consideration in
light of Kiobel itself. Conversely, there are nearly three times as many academic citations in that
same time span; the ATS is a bountiful topic indeed.
481. See, e.g., Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 WL 4564646, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (dismissing claims brought in a similar fact pattern to Kiobel, but with
even less corporate presence); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-483
RCL, 2013 WL 4427943, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (finding that Hezbollah rocket attacks
injuring American civilians did not sufficiently touch and concern the United States to be
actionable under ATS); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Queen Elizabeth II, No. 5:13-cv-103-RS-CJK,
2013 WL 2242459 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2013) (dismissing claims for damages during Apartheid
for failure to touch and concern United States).
482. See, e.g., Fotso v. Republic of Cameroon, No. 6:12 CV 1415-TC, 2013 WL 3006338, at
*7 (D. Or. June 11, 2013) (barring claims on the grounds that presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to ATS, without mention of “touch and concern” standard); see also
supra Part IV.B.1; supra note 431 and accompanying text (listing and discussing further cases of
lower courts’ application of Kiobel).
483. Correcting such errors is of course the proper task of the appellate courts, but it would be
preferable that they not occur in the first place. A cursory reading of Kiobel would reveal that the
presumption could be overcome; the Court says as much in the last paragraph of the holding.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (claims may
overcome presumption if they touch and concern the territory of the United States). Furthermore,
the very notion of a presumption means it can be rebutted.
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2. Varying Interpretations of “Touch and Concern”
Without a body of case law to provide common starting ground,
courts are approaching the majority’s “touch and concern” requirement
on a case-by-case basis. While some determinations are relatively
simple,484 others draw finer distinctions. For example, a terroristic
attack that injured Americans but targeted another nation does not touch
and concern the United States,485 whereas the bombing of an American
embassy does.486 Remarkably, one court has interpreted the Court’s
“touch and concern” language as referring to a necessary and external
prerequisite for further authorizing legislation, such as the TVPA.487
Under such an interpretation, no extraterritorial application of the ATS
is possible, save for that explicitly authorized by Congress along the
lines of the TVPA. The defendant’s citizenship has been found
dispositive as both sufficient and insufficient grounds for an ATS
claim.488
Perhaps the most rigorous489 interpretation of the issue has come out
of Giraldo v. Drummond,490 where a court in the Northern District of
Alabama held that an action was extraterritorial, and therefore
categorically barred by the presumption against the same unless the
action complained of occurred abroad.491

484. See, e.g., Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Obama, No. 1:13-cv-49-MW/GRJ, 2013 WL 3797287, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. July 19, 2013) (holding suit for recovery by unrelated alien for torture of North
Korean by North Korean government does not touch and concern the United States); supra note
432 and accompanying text (discussing frivolous ATS complaints).
485. Kaplan, 2013 WL 4427943, at *16 (finding that Hezbollah rocket attacks injuring
American civilians in Israel did not sufficiently touch and concern the United States to be
actionable under ATS).
486. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (terrorist attack on American
embassy in Afghanistan sufficiently touched and concerned the United States to be actionable
under ATS). Jurisdiction might also be upheld on the alternate grounds that such an attack would
physically touch American territory. In either case, the court preemptively certified the case for
review as presenting a substantive and controlling issue of first impression.
487. Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 WL 3229720, at *7–
10 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013) (noting that Kiobel rejected extraterritorial application of ATS, with
“touch and concern” applying only to specific authorizing statutes such as the TVPA), vacated in
light of Kiobel sub nom., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
488. See supra note 459 and accompanying text (noting that citizenship has been found to be
both sufficient and insufficient grounds for ATS jurisdiction post-Kiobel by different courts).
489. With only a handful of cases actually addressing the extent of the “touch and concern”
standard, this unfortunately means very little.
490. No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013).
491. Id. at *8. The Giraldo court reaches this conclusion through a web of alternatives and
double negatives as pure dicta, already having granted motions to dismiss on other grounds. It
looks to Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), holding that Morrison
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Under Justice Breyer’s test, these cases would likely come out the
same way. While there is an American interest in keeping its citizens
safe, an attack injuring, but not targeted at, Americans might not have a
sufficiently substantial effect to support jurisdiction; an attack on an
embassy, however, probably would be sufficiently substantial.492 Cases
involving an American defendant would receive ATS jurisdiction,493
and cases holding that the ATS categorically does not include
extraterritorial applications would be remanded for further
consideration.494
3. Courts Discussing Justice Breyer’s Test
Of the few cases that address Kiobel, only a handful discuss Justice
Breyer’s concurrence.495 Several have cited it, but three are particularly

directed courts to find extraterritoriality not based on the activity’s location but the statute’s
focus; if a claim alleges both domestic and foreign action, the presumption only applies if the
event under focus does not occur abroad. Because the ATS, however, does focus on specific
torts, the presumption will apply to an ATS claim if the focused event does occur abroad.
Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873960, at *8.
This interpretation would effectively bar all ATS claims not arising from domestic conduct,
unless the focus of the claims was domestic conduct, in which case the presumption would apply
to foreign portions of the claims only, thus barring the claims for different reasons. The ultimate
effect would be the same as simply barring all ATS claims based on extraterritorial action, as if
there was no exception. As the “touch and concern” exception was the entire point of the Kiobel
ruling, supra note 433 and accompanying text, the Giraldo interpretation seems unlikely to be
sound. Lastly, the Giraldo court notes that the Eleventh Circuit might be compelled to take up
the matter. Giraldo, 2013 WL 3873960, at *9. Given Giraldo’s convoluted analysis, that might
not be a bad idea.
492. Compare Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-483 RCL, 2013
WL 4427943 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (Hezbollah rocket attack against Israel injuring American
citizens as bystanders), with Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (Al-Qaeda
attack on American embassy).
493. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing potential of citizenship to categorically fulfill the
“touch and concern” standard).
494. As perhaps they should under the Kiobel standard, given that it makes no such
categorical statement. See supra text accompanying notes 489–491 (discussing Giraldo’s
rationale to determine that the ATS cannot apply extraterritorially). See generally supra Parts
IV.B.1, IV.D.1 (discussing court holdings that categorically deny the ATS extraterritorial
application).
Under Justice Breyer’s test, even though ATS claims would not be categorically barred from
extraterritorial application, they would still need to meet one of the three elements of his test in
order to obtain subject-matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, even if jurisdiction were found, claims
would still be subject to standard procedural controls such as comity, forum non conveniens, and
principles of exhaustion. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); supra Part I.D (discussing procedural requirements
that apply to ATS).
495. Of those, several dispose of their claims on TVPA grounds. See generally supra note
480 and accompanying text (discussing cases that address Kiobel).
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illustrative.
In Balintulo v. Daimler AG,496 the plaintiffs attempted to salvage
their extraterritorial claims in the wake of Kiobel by interpreting the
majority’s “touch and concern” standard as one part of a multi-factor
test and arguing that the ATS still covers foreign conduct when the
defendant is a United States citizen.497 The Second Circuit identified
this argument as being “precisely the conclusion reached by Justice
Breyer.”498 The court then proceeded to vigorously refute the
argument, holding that the majority clearly barred extraterritorial
applications of the ATS, and, more draconically, that “if all the relevant
conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under
Kiobel.”499 The court then curiously described the “touch and concern”
language as dicta, noting that, because all of the conduct in Kiobel
occurred abroad, a fact that was otherwise dispositive of the issue, “the
Court had no reason to explore, much less explain,” anything further.500
This analysis of the touch and concern standard as dicta appears
otherwise unprecedented.501
Despite the Second Circuit’s holding in Balintulo, the Southern
District of New York has cited Justice Breyer’s concurrence much more
favorably. In Tymoshenko v. Firtash,502 the court referred to Justice
Breyer’s concurrence to briefly summarize the facts of Kiobel.503 In
footnote four of its opinion,504 however, the Tymoshenko court noted
that the Kiobel majority did not outline a test with which to determine

496. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
497. Id. at 189.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 190.
500. Id. at 190–91.
501. Certainly it is one way of reaching the conclusion that ATS claims based on
extraterritorial action are always barred; nevertheless, until the Supreme Court’s rehearing of
Kiobel, the Second Circuit implicitly accepted such extraterritorial application. Its sudden
reversal, especially with such sharp language, is not clear. See id. at 191–92 (“In all cases,
therefore the ATS does not permit claims based on illegal conduct that occurred entirely in the
territory of another sovereign. . . . [T]he ATS cannot have extraterritorial reach simply because
some judges, in some cases, conclude that it should.”) (emphasis in original).
502. Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794, 2013 WL 4564646 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013).
Continuing the trend of single judges hearing multiple ATS claims in succession, see supra note
67 (Judge Bee heard M’Grath in 1794 and Bolchos in 1795), Tymoshenko was heard by Judge
Wood, who coincidentally was the district judge in Kiobel.
503. Tymoshenko, 2013 WL 4564646, at *4.
504. Not to be confused with the much better known Footnote Four. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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the bounds of its touch and concern standard.505 The court continued by
citing to the concurrences of Justices Alito and Breyer, concluding that
the plaintiff’s claims in Tymoshenko—political persecution, centered on
Ukrainian governmental corruption, with American claims anchored by
RICO allegations506—would fail under either proposed test.507
Addressing the issue more obliquely, the District Court for the
District of Columbia in Mwani v. Bin Laden508 briefly discussed Justice
Breyer’s concurrence, and found jurisdiction based on a “touch and
concern” analysis.509 The rationale underlying the determination,
however, was one of national interest: the court concluded that an attack
on an embassy is much more tied to American national interests than a
claim of foreign action where the defendant’s only tie is corporate
presence.510 In this manner, the Mwani court issued its ruling under the
overarching standard articulated by the majority, but used the categories
and terminology outlined by Justice Breyer to reach that determination.
The majority’s standard remained the controlling principle, and Justice
Breyer’s test provided the mechanics needed to clarify and interpret the
standard from a broader concept to something courts can apply to facts.
4. Kiobel Affirmed: DaimlerChrysler
AG v. Bauman
Five days after issuing Kiobel, the Court granted certiorari in a case
with the potential to provide some much-needed guidance for ATS
jurisprudence: Daimler AG v. Bauman.511 At issue in Daimler was a
pair of ATS and TVPA claims levied by an alien plaintiff against an
alien defendant for claims taking place abroad.512 The critical
difference from Kiobel was that in Daimler, the defendant was alleged
to have substantial corporate presence within the United States.513
Ruling in January 2014, the Supreme Court dismissed the case, not on
the subject-matter jurisdiction grounds of Kiobel, but instead for a lack

505. Tymoshenko, 2013 WL 4564646, at *4 n.5.
506. Id. at *1.
507. Id. at *4 n.4.
508. Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
509. Id. at *3–4.
510. Id. at *4.
511. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom.
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013), rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG
v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
512. Id. at 751–52.
513. Id. at 751.
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of personal jurisdiction.514
Nevertheless, because of the paucity of ATS litigation, especially at
the appellate level, Daimler bears mention.515 The actions at issue were
attributed to an indirect subsidiary of the only named defendant,
Daimler.516 The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction,
holding that jurisdiction over the subsidiary on these facts did not
impute the parent corporation, and that jurisdiction directly over the
parent would be improper.517
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding personal jurisdiction proper as an
exercise of general jurisdiction518: it held that Daimler had the requisite
contacts with the forum state,519 and such jurisdiction was
reasonable.520 Crucially, as part of its reasonableness analysis, it noted
that the ATS and TVPA gave American federal courts “a strong interest
in adjudicating and redressing international human rights abuses.”521 It
also briefly addressed the ATS claims independently, affirming its prior
position regarding exhaustion, treating it as an affirmative defense
rather than a requirement for jurisdiction.522
The Supreme Court took up the case framed on personal jurisdiction
grounds.
Most commentators anticipated a reversal on those
grounds,523 and indeed oral arguments confirmed that expectation.524
514. Id. at 761–62.
515. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (describing that appellate review of the ATS
is uncommon). Sosa addressed the substance of the ATS; Kiobel was granted to hear a more
fundamental issue of corporate jurisdiction and finally ruled upon for an even more fundamental
jurisdictional issue. In this effective “race to the bottom,” Daimler has thus managed to address
the only remaining—indeed, only possible—issue a priori to Kiobel: personal jurisdiction.
516. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 752.
517. Id.; see Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (granting motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but
preemptively certifying the issue for review).
518. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Co., 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011).
519. Id. at 920–24 (analyzing requisite contacts, concluding that sufficient contacts existed).
520. Id. at 924–30 (analyzing reasonableness, finding that jurisdiction comported with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice).
521. Id. at 927.
522. Id. at 918 n.10. Here, defendant raised—and lost on—exhaustion only in regards to the
TVPA claims. Because of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of exhaustion as an affirmative
defense, rather than a procedural requirement, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831–32
(9th Cir. 2008), Daimler’s failure to raise exhaustion was waiver. Bauman, 644 F.3d at 918 n.10.
523. See Amanda Frost, Academic highlight: Vanderbilt Law Review roundtable on
DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:29 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/academic-highlight-vanderbilt-law-review-roundtable-ondaimlerchrysler-ag-v-bauman/ (summarizing five legal commentators’ opinions on what action
the Court might take in DaimlerChrysler; all focus on personal jurisdiction).
524. Supreme Court commentators noted the reaction:
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Despite being the underlying causes of action, and certainly being
contentious enough on their own merits, neither the ATS nor the TVPA
made much of a showing at oral argument.525 In its ruling, the Court
focused heavily on personal jurisdiction, as might have been
expected.526 It ultimately held that, even if the subsidiary were to be
subject to jurisdiction, jurisdiction over the parent was not proper.527
Jurisdiction aside, the Court still took a moment to discuss the ATS
and Kiobel.528 The Ninth Circuit partially justified its grant of
jurisdiction by appealing to a strong interest in redressing human rights
abuses derived from the ATS and TVPA.529 The Supreme Court
offered a brusque dismissal of the rhetoric: “[r]ecent decisions of this
Court, however, have rendered plaintiffs’ ATS and TVPA claims
infirm.”530 The Court offered no other explanation, save a citation to
Kiobel531 and an admonishment that the Ninth Circuit “paid little heed”
to the risks that its extension of jurisdiction posed.532
The inference is clear enough: without the defendant’s corporate
presence within the United States, the case essentially collapses into the
facts of Kiobel, upon which it is undisputed that jurisdiction would not

[I]t was obvious that most of the members of the Court—and perhaps all—had reacted
negatively to the sweep of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Whatever rule of law they might
choose to overturn the Ninth Circuit, it appeared that they would find one that basically
would say this reach was just far too ambitious.
Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Trying to salvage a lost cause, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 15, 2013,
3:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argument-recap-trying-to-salvage-a-lost-cause/.
525. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–45, DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 133 S.
Ct. 746 (2014) (reaffirmation by counsel for respondent of belief that they had a valid claim under
Kiobel, but noting they were not asking Court to resolve the issue at that time).
526. Justice Ginsburg wrote for an eight-member majority reversing the Ninth Circuit; Justice
Sotomayor concurred in the judgment. Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 746
(2014). The Court’s lengthy opinion focused on and clarified its own precedents on specific and
general jurisdiction. Id. at 753–59; William Baude, Opinion recap: A stricter view of general
jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.c
om/2014/01/opinion-recap-a-stricter-view-of-general-jurisdiction/ (framing Daimler as a personal
jurisdiction decision, starting with a “remarkably long recharacterization” of Court precedent on
the issue).
527. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
528. Id. at 762–63.
529. Id.
530. Id.
531. Id. The Court also noted that corporate liability was not recognized under the TVPA,
though as the TVPA’s bar to liability derives from an explicit statutory provision, it has no
bearing on the ATS claim. Id. (citing Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1702,
1708 (2012)).
532. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763. Though not directly on point, the Supreme Court’s language
echoes the exhortation to judicial caution in Sosa. Supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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lie.533 It is unfortunate that the Court did not offer even a hint of
elaboration on the Kiobel standard, though such inaction is perfectly
understandable given the complexity of the jurisdictional issue that was
involved. With luck, the Court will have reason to address and clarify
Kiobel in the near future, providing the guidance its standard needs.
CONCLUSION
Despite being authorized directly by the Constitution, the Alien Tort
Statute lacks much by way of legal, legislative, or historical context, and
the Supreme Court has urged—and taken—a cautious approach to its
interpretation and application. In taking up Kiobel, all nine Justices
agreed that the ATS required limitation; they differed, however, as to
why, with the majority relying on the general presumption against
extraterritoriality and Justice Breyer offering an alternative three-part
test. Because of the lack of context or guidance by the majority, lower
courts have already encountered difficulties, sometimes directly
misstating and improperly applying the Court’s holding. Until the
Court addresses this matter again, it seems unlikely this confusion will
abate. In the meantime, and until the Court clarifies its language, it is
possible and preferable to interpret the majority’s standard through the
test laid out by Justice Breyer in order to provide the crucial guidance
necessary to ensure this venerable law remains cautiously, uniformly,
and appropriately applied.

533. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).

